Discriminatory and Exclusionary Mechanism on Labor Market and Employment in Lebanon
Executive Summary
Following the financial collapse of 2019, the repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the aftermath of the Beirut Port explosion on August 4, 2020, Lebanon has endured a series of overlapping crises that have led to an unprecedented rise in unemployment—particularly among income-vulnerable social groups. These crises have also deepened existing social inequalities in both income and wealth distribution.
Yet, the Lebanese labor market has long been characterized by systemic mechanisms of discrimination and exclusion, alongside the widespread normalization and legalization of informal labor practices. This is evident, for example, in the implementation of the kafala (sponsorship) system to regulate and manage migrant labor, which remained outside the scope of any legal framework, and in public sector hiring practices that rely heavily on temporary contracts, short-term arrangements, or outsourced employment through third parties.
This report seeks to explore the impact of such discriminatory and exclusionary mechanisms on the current and future structure of labor and employment markets in Lebanon.
In effect, the ongoing employment crisis in Lebanon disproportionately affects populations whose incomes have historically been precarious, as well as those who had been striving for formal recognition of their most basic rights. This includes women, older persons, youth under the age of 24, persons with disabilities, informal workers, LGBTQ+ individuals, as well as foreign nationals and refugees.
It is essential to note that addressing justice in employment requires a nuanced understanding of the intersecting nature of social injustices experienced by these groups.
Indeed, labor law violations or evasions in the Lebanese labor market frequently intersect with discriminatory and exclusionary practices based on race, skin color, age, health status, gender identity, or sexual orientation. These intersections place compounded burdens on already marginalized groups, who are subjected to multiple, overlapping forms of exclusion and discrimination.
This report aims to shed light on the conditions of these vulnerable groups within Lebanon’s labor force and to identify the key structural challenges facing labor and employment markets both before and after the 2019 crisis.
As a result—and considering the intertwined nature of social discrimination in labor markets—young women under the age of 24 currently experience the highest unemployment rates in the country. Among females aged 15 to 19, the rate reaches 75.3%, and among those aged 20 to 24, it is 48%.
Prior to 2019, data on the distribution of the labor force across formal and informal sectors showed that informal employment accounted for approximately 54.9% of total employment, with only slight gender disparities. By 2022, this figure had increased to 62.4%, indicating the growing prevalence of informal labor.
In this context, informal employment becomes the only viable option for many individuals who either lack access to formal job opportunities or face significant barriers to entering stable and socially protected labor markets, due to systemic exclusion or discrimination. This is particularly the case for LGBTQ+ individuals, older persons, women, and non-Lebanese workers.
However, informal labor often exposes these workers to precarious conditions, low wages, a lack of social protection, and limited claims to basic labor rights. Even when employment barriers are partially overcome, these vulnerable groups—especially women, migrants, and LGBTQ+ individuals—remain highly susceptible to violations of their fundamental rights in the workplace. This includes increased exposure to harassment, arbitrary treatment, wage discrimination, and other abuses, due to their limited mobility and restricted capacity to claim their rights[1].
Moreover, informal employment almost always entails an absence of social protection, including healthcare, retirement benefits, occupational accident insurance, and medical coverage[2].
Most notably, the agriculture and construction sectors continue to be among the most hazardous sectors for workers' health and safety. They are also the two sectors that rely most heavily on migrant labor. The vast majority of workers in agriculture and construction are employed informally, typically as temporary, seasonal, or daily laborers. These two productive sectors are also among those most prone to child labor and exploitation in Lebanon.
A recent study showed that 75% of working Syrian children in the Bekaa Valley are active in the agricultural sector. Syrian children are especially vulnerable to forced labor in agriculture, due to exploitative employment practices imposed by Lebanese agricultural investors[3].
These alarming figures reveal the weakness of Lebanon’s legal framework, particularly in relation to forced labor. Existing labor laws do not comply with international standards, and there is no legislative provision that criminalizes forced labor or stipulates penal sanctions against it. Moreover, debt bondage is not criminally prohibited in Lebanese law.
In addition, a recent study conducted by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in collaboration with the International Labour Organization (ILO) classified the agriculture and construction sectors in Lebanon as the "most hazardous industries for both adult and child workers[4]."
In addition to the limited scope of Lebanon’s current labor law, the law also suffers from several critical deficiencies, primarily due to its failure to account for the specific circumstances of several key social groups—despite their significant presence in the country’s labor force. These groups include migrant workers, refugees, and persons with disabilities, who remain largely excluded from legal protections, even as discrimination and exclusion continue to proliferate across labor and employment markets[5].
Recommendations on Maternity-Related Risks and Gender Gaps in the Lebanese Labor Market
First, although the 2014 amendment to Article 28 of the Lebanese Labor Law extended maternity leave from 7 to 10 weeks, this duration still falls short of international standards, particularly the International Labour Organization’s recommendations, which stipulate that maternity leave should not be less than 12 weeks.
Moreover, the Lebanese Social Security Law does not cover maternity leave, leaving the entire burden on the employer, and in many cases, subject to negotiation between the working mother and her employer. As a result, maternity rights have become a contested issue between female wage earners and employers.
Due to the absence of social protection against maternity-related risks, women are exposed to exclusionary employment practices, whereby men are favored over women even when qualifications and conditions are equal.
Second, neither the Labor Law nor the Social Security Law includes any mention of paternity leave, which leads to structural gender inequality. Introducing mandatory paternity leave could facilitate women’s return to work and thereby help mitigate the negative consequences of unequal career trajectories between men and women.
Indeed, career interruptions in Lebanon contribute significantly to gender gaps in income and wealth. The impact of this discrimination is most severe during the maternity stage, where the gender gap peaks at 32% among women aged 30 to 49, compared to a general average of 21% across the labor market[6].
Gender imbalance in Lebanon’s labor market continues to deepen due to the absence of a gender-sensitive perspective in labor legislation. For instance, current legal frameworks lack provisions that explicitly combat gender-based discrimination in hiring practices, despite the fact that Law No. 207, issued on May 26, 2000, formally prohibits discrimination based on gender in relation to employment, wages, recruitment, promotion, professional training, and dress code.
However, this law fails to include enforcement mechanisms, does not address gender-based discrimination in practical terms, and provides no obligations for employers to actively counteract such practices. As a result, laws prohibiting gender-based discrimination remain ineffective in narrowing gender gaps. This demonstrates that mere legal recognition of the need to eliminate gender discrimination is insufficient to achieve gender justice unless accompanied by proactive measures that require employers to demonstrate concrete efforts to counteract discrimination. These are referred to today as active gender transparency practices.
Such proactive measures legally oblige employers to justify wage disparities between men and women within their institutions and to address gender imbalances in leadership and company boards. Employers are also required to correct these disparities through targeted human resources policies.
In the absence of legislation mandating companies—particularly larger ones—to ensure gender equality in pay, significant progress in closing wage gaps remains unlikely. Men continue to dominate senior leadership positions, and women’s exclusion from corporate boards limits the possibility of reversing discriminatory practices.
Pay transparency laws, meanwhile, can enhance accountability around gender-based wage disparities. These laws require employers to disclose internal wage structures as part of their HR policies across all job categories. They must also inform employees of their rights, enable them to inquire about and discuss wages, and ensure they are protected from retaliation when doing so.
Typically, such laws also include provisions allowing employees to file internal complaints and seek legal remedies if they face wage discrimination. Support may be offered to companies that conduct independent gender pay audits, implement gender-neutral job evaluations, and actively work to close gender wage gaps.
While legislation alone may not be enough to narrow the gender gap, strong labor unions and robust collective bargaining systems play an essential role in promoting gender equality. Collective agreements often include clauses related to equal pay and require that gender not be a determining factor in wage setting processes.
Recommendations to fight Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Persecution of LGBTQ+ Individuals
The impact of the financial crisis in Lebanon on members of the LGBTQ+ community (lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transgender, non-binary, queer individuals, and others with diverse sexual orientations) is linked to the broader social and legal contexts, which require consideration of the Lebanese societal environment and the evolution of its values and social norms.
Members of the LGBTQ+ community suffer from severe violations of their fundamental rights, which are closer to persecution than mere discrimination, both inside and outside the workplace. This renders them highly socially vulnerable due to discriminatory practices or even persecution in employment, housing, and exposes them to violations of bodily integrity, under Article 534 of the Lebanese Penal Code, which criminalizes sexual relations "contrary to the order of nature" and punishes offenders with arrest and imprisonment for one year. In addition, there are societal stigmas that condemn sexual orientations not conforming to the binary understanding of gender — i.e., the normative, stereotypical, and traditional view of relationships between two individuals of different sexes, namely a man and a woman.
Studies have also shown that LGBTQ+ individuals face blatant violations of their fundamental rights daily in the workplace. These violations can take many forms, including physical assault and sexual exploitation by colleagues or employers, as well as daily micro-aggressions.
First and foremost, it must be emphasized that all forms of discrimination based on sexual orientation in the workplace and employment constitute a clear violation of Lebanese laws, particularly constitutional rights, and specifically Article 7 of the Constitution, which states the equality of all before the law.
Secondly, all these discriminatory practices can be considered violations of the current labor laws and regulations in Lebanon, despite the fact that the Labor Law of 1946 and its subsequent amendments do not explicitly recognize the rights of LGBTQ+ individuals, nor do they explicitly aim to prohibit discrimination mechanisms based on sexual orientation. Although criminalizing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation can be considered a blind spot in current laws, laws prohibiting all forms of sex-based discrimination may themselves serve as a fundamental starting point to assert that discriminatory practices against LGBTQ+ individuals constitute a clear violation of labor law. In particular, Law No. 207, issued on 26/5/2000, states the following: "Employers are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of sex between male and female workers regarding the type of work, wage amount, employment, promotion, advancement, professional qualification, and clothing."
Although this law amended Article 26 of the Labor Law, which falls within the category of women's labor, it constitutes a fundamental starting point to oppose all forms of discrimination against many, if not all, members of the LGBTQ+ community, first because some of its members identify with a gender different from the one assigned at birth, and secondly, and most importantly, because discrimination based on sexual orientation can be considered a form of sex-based discrimination prohibited under Law 207/2000.
This is supported by many legal opinions worldwide, which recognize discrimination based on sexual orientation as part of sex discrimination, applying equally to the former as it does to the latter.
Examples may vary, but we want to highlight that Article 26 today constitutes a starting point to reaffirm that discrimination based on sexual orientation is contrary to labor provisions, even given the aforementioned blind spots present in Lebanese laws. However, it is obviously insufficient as a sole legal reference to guarantee foundations of equality among all individuals in employment and work. Lebanese law must explicitly condemn all forms of discrimination, including on the basis of race, sexual orientation, and gender identity, while emphasizing equality in access to health insurance and prohibiting private insurance companies from practicing all forms of discrimination and exclusion.
Finally, emphasis should be placed on preventing all types of harassment in the workplace, including harassment based on sexual orientation or gender identity[7].
At this stage, it is worth noting that LGBTQ+ individuals suffer more than others from the lack of health coverage. A study by the "Hilm" Association showed that only 20% of those surveyed have private health insurance. Moreover, all health services fail to recognize many of their risks, including non-listed and non-covered medications, and the lack of recognition of some medical tests or surgical procedures, such as gender-affirming surgeries or hormone therapy.
On the other hand, what was previously mentioned regarding the opposition to discrimination based on sex or sexual orientation also applies to the criminalization of harassment.
Moreover, legislative amendments in the laws alone are not sufficient to combat harassment; internal policies and complaint procedures within institutions must also change. Employers should be encouraged or required to establish clear policies and procedures to combat harassment based on sex or sexual orientation. These policies should specify relevant guidelines concerning the reporting of harassment and molestation, as well as detailed procedures for investigating and condemning perpetrators.
Such internal policies are essential for the effective implementation of Law No. 205/2020, which criminalizes harassment. Employees and workers must feel empowered to report harassment without fear of retaliation or punishment—especially since members of the LGBTQ+ community are more vulnerable to repressive practices than others, largely due to the widespread fear among them of resorting to the judiciary because of the repercussions of Law 534.
Although many judges today apply the principle of victim protection over the principle of criminalization, as demonstrated by a study from the Legal Agenda, this harm reduction principle alone is not sufficient to guarantee safe access to the judiciary[8].
In conclusion, mechanisms of discrimination and exclusion based on sex remain primarily linked to the absence of legal texts aimed at protecting members of the LGBTQ+ community, in addition to those that criminalize their practices. This suggests that the current law permits the undermining or violation of their fundamental rights, both within and outside the workplace. Furthermore, Article 534 of the Penal Code sends a dangerous signal to employers, as it indicates that the legal and institutional framework in Lebanon not only overlooks violations of the rights of LGBTQ+ workers and laborers but is also tolerant or complicit with those who perpetrate discrimination and exclusion.
Recommendations Related to the Specific and Intersecting Challenges of Foreign Workers and Refugees
Foreign workers, whether migrants or refugees, constitute a large, albeit difficult to estimate, portion of the labor force in Lebanon. Lebanese labor markets have long relied on non-Lebanese workers who are subjected to some of the worst forms of exploitation. This exploitation intensified particularly before the 2019 crisis with the adoption of the sponsorship (kafala) system for Syrian workers, leading to unprecedented levels of abuse.
In the decade prior to the 2019 economic collapse, Lebanon hosted on average over 400,000 workers of non-Arab origin—migrants from Asia and Africa—under the kafala system, in addition to approximately 200,000 foreigners residing illegally, due to the demand for this type of cheap, legally unprotected labor. The number of illegally present domestic workers exceeded 120,000[9].
The financial crisis in Lebanon had a profound impact on migrant workers due to the collapse of the national currency, which narrowed the wage gap between foreigners, whose salaries were supposed to be paid in dollars, and local workers—whether Lebanese, Syrian, or Palestinian—who were paid in Lebanese pounds. This led to a fundamental shift in the labor market balances that existed prior to the crisis.
The economic contraction and financial crisis caused widespread job losses and a rise in unemployment rates among both Lebanese and non-Lebanese workers. However, migrants—especially those employed in severely affected sectors—were disproportionately impacted.
The economic contraction and financial crisis have led to widespread job losses and increased unemployment rates among both Lebanese and non-Lebanese workers. However, migrants—particularly those employed in sectors fundamentally affected by the crisis such as construction, domestic work, and tourism—have suffered disproportionately from job insecurity, unpaid wages, and dismissal. They are often severely vulnerable due to limited legal protections and weak social support networks, healthcare, and essential legal services necessary for their wellbeing and protection. The financial crisis has exacerbated their vulnerability by restricting their ability to seek assistance, move freely, or access healthcare services.
The most significant repercussions on the conditions of foreign workers of non-Arab origin are, first, their dismissal from jobs, which directly results in the loss of their residency rights in Lebanon since residency is linked to employment rights. Secondly, they face expulsions under conditions that violate the administrative frameworks regulating their work, namely the kafala system, which is oppressive to their rights. This includes non-payment of wages or travel expenses, in addition to intimidation and violence perpetrated by employers who coerce them to accept salaries in Lebanese pounds instead of dollars, thus making them bear the full losses caused by the currency collapse.
Given the increasing scholarly attention on the kafala system in recent years, it suffices to cite the comprehensive study presented by the Legal Agenda in cooperation with the International Labour Organization, which concluded that the kafala system essentially constitutes a regime designed to protect employers at the expense of workers. It provides employers with immunity from accountability—it is an administrative practice, not a legal framework—and enables Lebanese employers to engage in unlawful practices without allowing the workers subject to it to claim any legal protection, due to their absence from courts and the failure of employers to face judicial scrutiny, often through deporting the worker before justice is served[10].
The study concludes that the kafala system has resulted in the foreign worker’s inability to seek justice, as well as the widespread use of trials in absentia, which usually proceed after the worker has been deported. Moreover, the practice of kafala ultimately prioritizes the powers of the public security authorities over the judiciary, in addition to being blatant violations of many fundamental rights.
From this arises the necessity to abolish kafala practices, as proposed by the Ministry of Labor in 2020, and to replace it with a unified employment contract. Furthermore, there is a need to revisit a set of specific recommendations made by the Legal Agenda, including the imperative of ensuring justice by guaranteeing that complaints submitted by domestic workers reach trial without their deportation.
This objective should also be linked to the state’s responsibility to combat gender-based violence and gender-based discrimination. Additionally, the nationality of the workers should be taken into account in courts and arbitration councils to reduce legal deadlines, thereby ensuring the delivery of justice within reasonable timeframes.
In addition, foreign workers suffer from discrimination due to Decree No. 17561 issued on 18 September 1964, which regulates the work of foreigners in Lebanon, and Law No. 129, which restricts the right of foreigners to work by imposing official procedures that are open-ended and lack specified deadlines. This also contradicts the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Lebanon acceded to under Decree No. 3855 issued on 1 September 1972, particularly Article 59 of the Labor Law, which stipulates that foreign employees, upon dismissal, enjoy the same rights as Lebanese workers on the condition of reciprocity, and that they are required to obtain a work permit from the Ministry of Labor. However, this provision lacks any mechanism obliging employers to comply with its terms regarding dismissal and the granting of the same rights afforded by law to Lebanese workers.
Regarding Palestinian workers, Law No. 129 issued on 24 August 2010, which amended Article 59, acknowledges that the laws and decisions regulating the Palestinian presence in Lebanon have been, and continue to be, harsh and significantly undermine their human rights. This has contributed to the exacerbation of their suffering since their displacement, most notably the laws and decrees related to the right to work.
Law 129/2010 has not been implemented due to the absence of an executive decree to enforce it. This calls for reflection on the prevailing pattern in labor policies characterized by discrimination. Labor policies consistently treat Palestinian labor as foreign labor competing with Lebanese labor, necessitating protective measures for Lebanese workers through the exclusion of Palestinians from certain professions and sectors and complicating their access to labor markets. This is despite the fact that Palestinian labor was born on Lebanese soil, has lived in Lebanon for several generations, and contributes like other Lebanese residents by attracting foreign remittances through family support from expatriates or international aid.
Over the past decade, many local and international organizations have attempted to address the issue of Palestinian labor in Lebanon. In 2010, a significant development occurred with the amendment of Social Security Law No. 128, which allowed Palestinian refugees to benefit from the National Social Security Fund in terms of end-of-service indemnities and exempted them from the reciprocity principle. However, the scope of these benefits was not extended to include health, maternity, and hospitalization funds.
Until today, the executive decrees necessary to implement Laws 128 and 129 issued in August 2010 have not been drafted. Consequently, Palestinians remain victims of sterile controversy related to demographic risk, and more specifically, politically charged and highly questionable statistical estimates regarding the total Palestinian population in Lebanon and their labor force participation rates. Additionally, they face existential risks from many Lebanese politicians who perceive the permanent settlement or naturalization (Tawtin) of Palestinians as a threat.
Regardless of any debate about the total Palestinian population, the discrepancy between these various sources reveals a continuous decline in the number of Palestinians residing in Lebanon. Undoubtedly, the number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is steadily decreasing due to ongoing migration to Western countries, the deterioration of their economic conditions in Lebanon, and the restrictions imposed on their right to work and their economic and social rights.
Recommendations Related to the Risks of Aging and the Challenges of Protecting Older Persons in Lebanon
Issues related to the rights of elderly individuals constitute a fundamental concern in Lebanon due to the weakness of the national social protection system and the absence of effective and comprehensive protections, which were available only partially and exclusively to a minority of working groups prior to the 2019 crisis through the public sector or some union funds.
From this perspective, the marginalization of old-age security in labor policies over recent decades is striking, despite its importance—especially when considering its critical role within Lebanon’s demographic composition. Lebanon remains one of the weakest national systems in the Arab world regarding protection against old-age risks, despite being one of the most advanced Arab societies in terms of population age structure.
As a result of these demographic developments, the phenomenon of population aging is expected to increase significantly in the future. It is projected that the number of people aged 60 and above will more than double between 2020 and 2050, from approximately 765,000 individuals (11.2% of the total population) to 1,700,000 individuals (27.1%). Meanwhile, the number of people aged 15 to 24 is expected to decline by about one-third[11].
The financial crisis has jeopardized the economic well-being of older adults, as pension incomes and savings have lost value or been affected by currency fluctuations, leading to a decline in their purchasing power and financial stability. Many retirees, especially those from the private sector, have faced the freezing of their bank deposits due to the absence of a functional pension system.
According to a recent survey by the International Labour Organization and the Central Administration of Statistics, 28.4% of older adults aged 65 and above were living on an income below 470,000 Lebanese pounds per month in 2018, the period immediately preceding the financial crisis—an amount slightly exceeding 300 US dollars at that time, compared to a purchasing power parity of around 450 US dollars[12].
The financial crisis has placed significant pressure on the healthcare system. As a result of the deteriorating capacity to protect retirees against the risks of aging, most elderly individuals today face substantial difficulties in meeting their basic needs and daily expenses. Even before the crisis, the majority of older adults in Lebanon were unable to access adequate healthcare, independent housing, or a decent quality of life.
The retirement challenges caused by the financial crisis have forced many elderly people to revise their retirement plans and extend their participation in the labor force. Employment among older adults has become increasingly common in Lebanon. With diminishing savings and financial resources, many elderly individuals seek to continue working beyond retirement age to support themselves and their families. This situation creates additional physical challenges, sometimes requiring them to accept working conditions or wages that do not align with their health status or skills, alongside risks of discrimination or mistreatment.
From this standpoint, it is essential to recognize the value of older individuals through the adoption of comprehensive age-inclusive labor policies and addressing discrimination based on age or health status. These policies should ensure their effective participation in the workforce and leverage their skills and knowledge by introducing reforms that promote flexible work arrangements and extend working life. This includes raising the retirement age, implementing phased retirement programs, providing incentives for continued employment, and allowing older workers to remain active in the labor market if they choose. Furthermore, pension reforms are necessary, often involving adjustments to eligibility criteria and contribution rates to address pension gaps and reduce poverty rates among older adults.
Given that Lebanon’s demographic composition predicts an intensification of population aging in the coming years, policies promoting active aging and social integration of older adults in labor markets are vital to improving their quality of life. In addition, there is a need for more comprehensive social protection legislation to guarantee adequate social security entitlements and pensions for the elderly, as well as labor laws that prevent age discrimination in hiring and workplace practices to protect economically active older adults late in their careers.
Laws must prohibit age discrimination in the workplace and ensure equal employment opportunities for older persons. This includes building fair and sustainable pension systems, improving coverage for informal workers, and addressing gender gaps in pension entitlements.
Recommendations Related to Exclusion and Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities
It is now universally recognized that, given a supportive environment, persons with disabilities can perform most jobs and participate successfully in business.
State social interventions and labor regulations in many countries focus on addressing employment and income gaps affecting persons with disabilities, adapting active labor market policies, promoting vocational training or reintegration, and supporting advocacy campaigns or public awareness initiatives aimed at changing negative attitudes and combating stigma against persons with disabilities in the workplace and elsewhere.
Despite these efforts, persons with disabilities worldwide remain vulnerable to numerous rights violations. They constitute a disproportionately large share of the unemployed across various productive sectors and face higher unemployment rates throughout their lives compared to the rest of the workforce, including during youth and older age groups.
Lebanon lags behind many countries that have implemented a series of political initiatives to improve persons with disabilities’ access to employment, education, and skills development. Indeed, Lebanon is one of only 16 countries worldwide that do not provide social pensions to persons with disabilities[13].
Persons with disabilities in Lebanon suffer from a lack of access to stable, socially protected employment due to discrimination or deficiencies in education and employment policies, as will be elaborated below. The vast majority remain excluded from labor markets throughout their lives, while only 1% of school-age persons with disabilities are integrated into formal schooling[14].
When persons with disabilities do find employment, they often face informal working conditions with lower wages and lack the protections they urgently need. In fact, the rate of informal employment among persons with disabilities in Lebanon reaches 63.8%, higher than the 43.4% rate among non-disabled persons. Finally, workers with severe disabilities earn on average 35% less than those without disabilities, with a larger wage gap of 37% in the formal private sector[15].
It is essential to continue raising awareness, improving accessibility, and strengthening legal protections to build a society that values diversity, inclusivity, and equal opportunities for all.
From this perspective, several countries, including some in the Arab region, have introduced mandatory employment quotas for persons with disabilities as a minimum threshold for public and private sector employers. These laws typically apply to organizations exceeding a certain number of employees.
Often, such legislation includes provisions allowing employers to meet quotas through alternative means—such as subcontracting, outsourcing, or procuring goods and services from persons with disabilities—especially in public procurement contracts, as exemplified by Tunisia. Some countries also use public subsidies and government assistance to support the employment, training, and integration of persons with disabilities, with particular emphasis on women[16].
In Lebanon, the issue of persons with disabilities and inclusive employment has gained significant attention in recent years. While legal recognition of the importance of disability inclusion and anti-discrimination measures has advanced, there remains an urgent practical need to effectively combat discrimination against persons with disabilities both inside and outside the workplace.
It is important to note that discrimination based on disability intersects with age and gender discrimination. Disability prevalence rises with age: between 16% and 21% among those aged 65 and above, compared to only 2.6% among the 15–64 age group. The highest rates are among older non-Lebanese women (21%), followed by older Lebanese women (19.4%)[17].
Although Lebanese law condemns discrimination against persons with disabilities, it lacks effective penalties for violations, rendering enforcement exceedingly difficult.
Furthermore, the coverage of persons with disabilities in Lebanon needs reevaluation. Official figures estimate a disability prevalence of no more than 3%, whereas global rates average around 16%[18].
Persons with disabilities who obtain official disability cards from the Ministry of Social Affairs are entitled to various benefits, including assistive devices (wheelchairs, crutches, hearing aids) and tax exemptions (municipal fees, property taxes, customs duties, and vehicle registration fees). However, coverage of these cards is indisputably far below the required level—both in terms of providing necessary means for social integration and economic activity, and in excluding a large proportion of persons with disabilities from these benefits, although the exact scale of exclusion remains difficult to assess.
Most importantly, there is a necessity to reconsider the level of government spending on persons with disabilities in line with the completion of Law 220 issued on 29/5/2000, as well as the completion of the project to establish a platform for organizations of persons with disabilities as part of the national social protection strategy, which aims to create governmental assistance for persons with disabilities.
It is worth noting here that government spending on persons with disabilities goes beyond merely being a social lever for achieving social justice; such spending can take the form of productive investment expenditure if it comes within integrated social programs aimed at including persons with disabilities and combating the underutilization of their labor. It is important to recall that the productive or investment dimension of social spending on disability was recognized by Law 220, which was ratified and approved by the Parliament on 29/5/2000. This law ratified the draft law contained in Decree 1834 related to the rights of persons with disabilities.
However, this law, which forms a set of committees and national bodies specialized in labor, health, training, and sports, and establishes a series of rights such as the right to housing, work, and non-discrimination, remains insufficient to activate these “formal” laws and make them effective in the absence of practical procedures and strict penalties that ensure the realization of these rights.
According to Article 73, the law stipulates the allocation of jobs in the public sector for persons with disabilities at no less than 3% of the total number of all categories and jobs, without mentioning mechanisms to verify the achievement of this goal or corrective steps to close gaps, or completing the law with active labor policies aimed at achieving it.
Also, Article 74 obliges employers in the private sector with no fewer than 20 and no more than 60 employees to hire at least one disabled worker, and 3% in institutions with more than 60 employees. However, violations require employers to pay a nominal fine amounting to twice the minimum wage annually for each employee, which does not constitute any real deterrent but rather presents an actual obstacle to the employment and inclusion of persons with disabilities—especially since most institutions in Lebanon are micro, small, or medium-sized enterprises with fewer than 20 employees and therefore are not subject to Article 74.
Therefore, there is a need to reconsider the level of penalties resulting from violations, especially the incentives derived from employing persons with disabilities, according to Article 75 of the law, and not to link them to the minimum wage but rather expand the range of beneficiaries so that they form a real lever for employment and integration, not just a symbolic recognition of abstract rights that cannot be enforced.
Furthermore, Article 76 limited itself to considering that “No employee may be dismissed due to a disability unless that disability prevents him/her from performing the job they are assigned or any other job within the administration,” without specifying any of these conditions. This also makes it merely a symbolic recognition that is not practically enforceable, especially with the absence of occupational health services in the majority of companies and institutions in Lebanon.
It is also important to define mechanisms to prevent dismissal from work and to establish procedures that prohibit discrimination on health grounds in hiring, wages, and promotion.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the Lebanese labor markets have witnessed sharp changes, influenced by production crises that coincided with the financial collapse in 2019, in addition to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Beirut Port explosion on August 4, 2020.
These multiple crises that Lebanon has been experiencing have led to an unprecedented rise in unemployment rates, especially among the most vulnerable social groups. They have also contributed to deepening social disparities in income and wealth. However, the reality of work and employment in Lebanon has long been characterized by mechanisms of discrimination and exclusion, which have contributed to reduced labor productivity and the widening of wage gaps among different working groups.
These mechanisms of discrimination and exclusion, whose structural roots date back to the pre-crisis period, are linked to the institutional and legal framework that has governed labor markets and employment in Lebanon since the issuance of the Labor Law in 1946. Economic labor policies throughout the post-war period have contributed to weakening the legal protections that were considered achievements of the labor and trade union movements during the war. In addition, the spread and legalization of work outside legal frameworks have been normalized, as is evident, for example, from the sponsorship contracts used to regulate foreign labor from outside the country through legal legislation, or as shown by employment mechanisms in the public sector in recent years, which mainly rely on temporary work contracts, contracting, outsourcing, and subcontracting employment to third parties.
This report seeks to encompass the impact of these mechanisms of discrimination and exclusion on the current and future social composition of labor markets and employment. The analysis on which our study is based rests on a fundamental hypothesis that the financial collapse is not the main cause of the recent worsening of living and social crises; rather, production and employment crises have their roots in distortions of social justice that have prevailed and worsened over decades.
Moreover, the practices that have contributed to the deterioration of labor markets and employment outcomes within the framework of these crises — such as collective or arbitrary dismissals, firing workers, wage reductions or non-payment, and so on — have found multiple sources in flagrant violations of labor rights over decades, as well as fertile ground for their continuation.
The failure of labor policies and workforce regulation tools, and their neglect of their fundamental role in maintaining the protections stipulated by Lebanese laws and international treaties.
We do not intend, of course, to diminish the importance of the financial collapse or the scale of the successive crises Lebanon has been experiencing—from the refugee crisis to the Beirut Port explosion on August 4, 2020. What we mean is that the sharp rise in unemployment rates, underemployment, and the deteriorating conditions in labor markets and production outcomes would not have reached their current state if they had been managed with policies that preserve the minimum rights of workers. In other words, if these conditions had not been sustained through mechanisms of rights violations that labor policies have contributed to producing and institutionalizing over recent decades.
From this standpoint, the current crises in Lebanon represent a scientific and experimental laboratory that allows the study of the structural links between labor justice and labor market effectiveness. Contrary to liberal beliefs that prevailed in past centuries, economic sciences now show—even in their liberal references—that labor justice is not at all separable from overall economic efficiency. Rather, it is central to securing the sound foundations of a sustainable production system capable of absorbing external shocks and major crises, as demonstrated by theoretical and empirical studies pioneered by the economist Amartya Sen, Nobel laureate in Economics in 1998.
Moreover, the global economic crisis of 2008–2009 provided an additional opportunity to deepen this intersection between labor rights and the effectiveness of national systems in confronting crises, revealing the role of legal protections in mitigating the collapse of production systems, adding additional resources, and helping to break the vicious cycle of collapse that, during crises, takes the form of reduced production, increased layoffs, lower demand for goods and services, and a more dangerous decline in production rates.
Contributions by the American economist Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel laureate in Economics in 2001, further deepened the consensus on the importance of labor system justice in achieving automatic stabilization mechanisms for production and employment markets during crises—that is, strengthening the capacity of national systems to overcome external shocks by maintaining at least the minimum consumption capacity of socially vulnerable groups. This, in turn, enhances the macroeconomic ability to reduce the severity of the vicious cycle of contraction-unemployment-recession-unemployment[19].
Returning to Lebanon’s crises, Lebanese society today is paying a heavy price for decades of neglecting labor justice issues, which have manifested in various forms. These include tax justice distortions, legislation that undermines the rights of many working groups—both foreigners and Lebanese—deepening income and wage gaps between sectors, and overlooking fraudulent or evasive practices regarding labor laws, especially with the rapid spread of new employment contracts that have found fertile ground in Lebanon, even in the public sector, through temporary contracts, contracting, and self-employment[20].
The second hypothesis on which this report is based is that the social impacts that have weighed heavily on Lebanese society as a whole have had varying effects across different social groups, primarily burdening the most vulnerable groups and individuals[21].
Indeed, labor crises in Lebanon have negatively and primarily affected historically vulnerable groups in terms of income, as well as those who had previously sought official recognition of their basic minimum rights, as this report will clarify—especially women, the elderly, youth under 24 years old, persons with disabilities, workers in informal sectors, members of the LGBTQ+ community, foreigners, and refugees.
It is worth noting here that addressing labor justice requires considering the intersecting nature of social injustice experienced by these groups.
Indeed, violations or circumventions of labor laws in Lebanon’s labor markets intersect with practices of exclusion and discrimination based on race, skin color, age, health status, as well as gender identity or sexual orientation. This imposes additional burdens on these already marginalized groups due to the accumulation and intersection of exclusion and discrimination mechanisms.
This is what this report aims to achieve by shedding light on the reality of these groups and their position within Lebanon’s labor force, as well as identifying the main problems they face in labor and employment markets before and after the 2019 crisis.
Methodology
Our study adopted a scientific research design based on a mixed-methods approach, combining both quantitative and qualitative methods. This research design aims to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the complex details related to the conditions of vulnerable groups and the protections they need inside and outside the Lebanese labor market, through data triangulation by integrating both secondary and primary sources.
The study conducted a comprehensive review of the scientific literature from various fields—economic, social, and legal—relying on comparisons of key amendments and reforms implemented worldwide to combat all forms of exploitation, discrimination, and exclusion in labor relations.
Quantitative data were collected from official sources such as the Central Administration of Statistics in Lebanon and the International Labour Organization.
As for qualitative data, 11 focused group discussions were organized, including diverse groups such as:
- Three sessions with persons with disabilities in collaboration with the Lebanese Federation of Physically Disabled Persons,
- Three sessions with construction workers,
- Two sessions with Palestinian workers,
- Two sessions with agricultural workers,
- Additionally, focused group discussions with women’s groups to discuss issues related to gender-based discrimination.
The focus group discussions were conducted face-to-face in three locations: Beirut, Tripoli, and Chtoura, during the period from June to October 2023. These sessions involved 178 participants, including 117 men and 61 women.
[INSERT TABLE 1 – HERE]
The research methodology relied on conducting multiple working meetings with representatives and researchers from the Halaam Association to discuss issues of gender discrimination and violations affecting members of the LGBTQ+ communities.
In the end, a roundtable workshop was organized that brought together 15 representatives from civil society organizations. This workshop served as a platform to analyze the results of the focus group discussions and to strengthen cooperation with these organizations.
[INSERT TABLE 2 – HERE]
CHAPTRE 1
A Brief Overview of the General Impacts of Lebanon’s Crises on Vulnerable Groups’ Income and Rights Protections
The 2019 financial crisis had a negative impact on all segments of Lebanese society due to the depreciation of the national currency, inflation, and the absence of economic stability. This instability resulted in rationing of essential goods—particularly fuel, electricity, wheat and bread, and medicine—especially in sectors where the Central Bank claimed to defend the fixed exchange rate solely for importers, without considering other goods, through Circular 530 issued on October 1, 2019.
The burdens of financial and living crises were also the outcome of political engineering aimed at unevenly distributing losses or securing additional gains for private interests. For example, the Central Bank supported importers of medicine, fuel, and flour at the expense of consumers, producers, workers, or employers. Labor policies have placed the burden of these crises on workers, who are precisely the ones most in need of protection and rights[22].
The financial crisis imposed heavy burdens on small and medium enterprises, which constitute the backbone of the Lebanese economy. These enterprises faced multiple challenges in accessing financing and importing essential materials, leading to closures and layoffs.
The crisis led to a significant increase in unemployment rates, forcing many companies to downsize by closing branches or reducing production; some even ceased operations entirely. Productive institutions were compelled to lay off numerous employees and dismiss many contractors, temporary, and informal workers.
These practices can be explained by several factors, including decreased sales due to reduced purchasing power among most residents, financial restrictions imposed by banks, and some institutions’ strategic use of the crisis to eliminate both permanent and temporary staff, restructuring their operations to align with profitability requirements.
The dismissal mechanisms at the American University of Beirut serve as a model for understanding similar actions taken by many productive institutions in Lebanon. More than 800 employees were dismissed without involving the Ministry of Labor, in addition to over 800 temporary or casual workers. This occurred through replacing legal procedures with political negotiations with the powers that be, effectively excluding individuals with the least protection. Arbitrary and patronage-based dismissals prevailed, mirroring the patronage-based hiring practices that dominated before the crisis[23].
According to the International Labour Organization and the Central Administration of Statistics, the unemployment rate in Lebanon rose from approximately 11% in 2018-2019 to over 29% in 2020, representing an addition of more than 330,000 new unemployed individuals. Unemployment rates reached unprecedented levels, particularly among youth under the age of 24. The gender gap in the labor force has worsened, with women being disproportionately affected by unemployment and underemployment compared to men. Moreover, the unemployment rate increased relatively more among women actively participating in the labor market.
The labor force participation rate for youth aged 15 to 24 declined from 39.2% in 2018-2019 to 34.3% in 2022. For women, participation decreased from 29% to 22%.
Consequently, the unemployment rate among youth under 24 increased from 23.3% to 47.8%, representing the largest share of newly unemployed individuals and those most likely to emigrate. During the same period, the unemployment rate among women rose from 14.3% to 32.7%[24].
It is worth noting that the COVID-19 pandemic and the Beirut port explosion on August 4th have exacerbated the economic challenges and intensified the impact of the financial crisis on the Lebanese labor market overall, further deepening gender disparities.
Given this context, and considering the intersecting nature of social discrimination in labor markets, the current unemployment rates in Lebanon are the highest ever recorded for young women (under 24 years old), reaching 75.3% for females aged 15 to 19, and 48% for those between 20 and 24 years. Unemployment rates for female university graduates are higher than those for illiterate males or males who have never enrolled in any educational system, specifically 31.2% for female graduates compared to 30.5% for illiterate males[25].
The crisis has also increased the divide between high-skilled workers and those with lower levels of education and skills. Economic contraction and the lack of future prospects have pushed many highly skilled individuals to seek employment opportunities abroad, contributing to brain drain—a persistent feature of Lebanese labor markets over recent decades. This has led to a loss of talent and skills from the local labor market, exacerbating stagnation and threatening long-term development trajectories[26].
Consequently, the emigration of valuable skills, knowledge, and expertise essential for economic growth and development deepens the gaps in income and protections—especially between individuals who are able to secure employment opportunities abroad and those whose work is limited to the domestic or local markets. This dynamic establishes a future rift between sectors active in the local economy and those producing for foreign markets, which also underpins disparities between public sector and private sector workers.
Migration also leads to family disintegration, as individuals and families are forced to live apart due to the necessity of seeking better opportunities abroad. This can have social consequences on family welfare and cohesion, placing older adults in more vulnerable situations by increasing social insecurity among the elderly, retirees, and persons with disabilities due to their lack of legal and social protections.
With the scarcity of formal employment opportunities, many individuals have shifted from permanent, socially protected contracts to informal work as a survival strategy. The informal sector expands to include activities such as street vending, freelance work, and independent labor, which often lack legal protections and social security benefits[27].
Before 2019, the distribution of the workforce between the formal and informal sectors indicated that informal employment accounted for approximately 54.9% of total employment. By 2022, the share of informal employment had risen to 62.4%[28].
Under these circumstances, informal employment becomes the only viable option for many individuals who lack access to formal, socially protected labor markets or face significant barriers to entering them—primarily members of the LGBTQ+ community, older adults, non-Lebanese residents, and women. Even when these employment barriers are overcome, work in the informal sector often exposes these individuals to precarious conditions, such as low wages, lack of social protection, and limited ability to claim basic labor rights.
These vulnerable groups—especially women, migrants, and members of the LGBTQ+ community—are disproportionately affected by violations of their fundamental rights in the workplace. These include increased exposure to repression, harassment, discretionary and discriminatory wage practices, and their relatively limited capacity to seek redress or advocate for their rights[29].
Finally, informal employment frequently means the absence of social protection coverage, including access to healthcare, retirement benefits, workplace accident insurance, and health insurance[30].
In general, the mechanisms of fragmentation and discrimination within Lebanon’s social protection system suffer from justice gaps among the various components of the Lebanese workforce. This issue will be addressed in the following chapter.
CHAPTRE 2
The Fragmented Landscape and Specificities of the Social Protection System in Lebanon
Since the enactment of the Labor Law in 1946, civil society in Lebanon—through its diverse components, including trade unions, political parties, as well as popular movements and both unionized and non-unionized labor protests—has sought to advance the ongoing process of securing social rights for all citizens in Lebanon by advocating for the enforcement of labor laws and the implementation of social protection mechanisms.
These demand-driven movements gradually contributed to the introduction of social protection mechanisms, although comprehensive policies aimed at treating all citizens on the basis of equality and justice remained absent.
Currently, Lebanon hosts multiple mandatory welfare and insurance systems, with origins dating back to 1963 during the presidency of Fouad Chehab, who introduced the principles of legally mandated social insurance. Prior to this, social protection was largely the responsibility of family institutions, civil society associations, and religious or political organizations.
The first achievements crystallized with the establishment of cooperative funds for public sector employees in January 1963, followed by the creation of social security for the private sector in September of the same year—an initial phase intended to be succeeded by comprehensive inclusion of all citizens. To this day, this remains an aspirational goal for social policies, which have yet to fulfill their promises. It is imperative to revisit and activate these policies, as they constitute official recognition of social rights, such as the establishment of work emergency funds, maternity funds, and old-age security.
The system of health expenditure coverage in Lebanon distributes this responsibility across multiple institutions, the most prominent of which are:
- National Social Security Fund
- Cooperative Fund for Civil Servants (State Employees)
- Internal Security Forces Cooperative Fund
- Army Forces Cooperative Fund
- Ministry of Public Health
The overall social protection landscape consists of the Cooperative Fund for State Employees and public administration staff, as well as cooperatives for the army, military personnel, and armed forces, which include security and military agencies along with civilian employees in the army, internal security, and general security — excluding wage workers and contractors. Private sector employees fall under the social insurance system administered by the National Social Security Fund, which since its establishment in 1963 has remained exclusive to formal private-sector employees.
There are numerous mutual aid funds catering to specific professional groups, providing supplementary coverage or pension benefits, such as the mutual aid fund for Lebanese University professors or for private school teachers. Furthermore, citizens not covered by any social insurance system can benefit from support by the Ministry of Public Health, which can cover up to 85% of hospitalization costs for critical cases among the most vulnerable groups.
Formal private-sector employees are covered by the National Social Security Fund, financed by contributions amounting to 23.5% of the salary, with the employer legally obligated to pay 21.5% and the employee 2%. The Fund’s coverage includes health insurance, maternity care, work emergencies for insurance against occupational accidents and diseases — though this remains unimplemented to date — in addition to family allowances for household risks and educational support, which grants male employees benefits for each child and spouse, while female employees receive benefits for their children only if the husband is not registered with social security or cannot be registered. The Fund also includes an end-of-service compensation scheme.
Although the Lebanese Labor Law excludes, in Article 7, many professions and sectors such as agriculture, construction, and domestic work from its provisions, legislators at the time hoped to enact specific laws for these sectors. However, these remain legal blind spots to this day, with no specific legislation covering them under Lebanese law.
Due to the exceptions in Article 7, workers in these sectors do not benefit from the legal protections imposed by labor law, including minimum wage, regulations against arbitrary dismissal, limits on working hours, annual leave, and other public order provisions.
Notably, the agriculture and construction sectors remain among the most hazardous in terms of occupational health and safety risks. They also rely heavily on foreign labor. Historically, employers in these sectors have prioritized foreign and refugee labor. Additionally, the intermittent and seasonal nature of work in these sectors correlates with low wages and poor skill levels, often forcing workers to depend on multiple employers simultaneously and endure long periods of unemployment.
Workers in these two sectors — whether foreign or Lebanese — face discrimination in wages and housing. For instance, they are often compelled to live with their families in proximity to their workplaces, such as workshops or agricultural fields, while still being denied access to the various branches and services provided by the National Social Security Fund.
The vast majority of labor in agriculture and construction is informal, predominantly consisting of temporary and daily wage workers. These sectors are also the most vulnerable to child labor and its exploitation in Lebanon.
Since the influx of Syrian refugees in 2011, child labor has increased markedly across various sectors, with exploitation conditions worsening for both Lebanese and Syrian children, especially in agriculture, while child labor in construction has been relatively lower due to the stagnation of building activities.
A recent study showed that 75% of working Syrian children in the Bekaa Valley are employed in agriculture. Syrian children are also at risk of forced labor in agriculture due to the employment conditions imposed by Lebanese agricultural investors, who favor large Syrian families with many children, as they provide cheap or unpaid forced labor. Consequently, some Syrian refugee children and their families in the Bekaa Valley are coerced into various forms of forced agricultural labor to pay for temporary housing provided by landowners[31].
These alarming figures reveal the weakness of the legal framework in Lebanon, where laws related to forced labor do not comply with international standards, and where there is no legislative text stipulating criminal penalties to combat forced labor. Moreover, debt bondage—that is, endless labor to repay accumulated or never-ending debts—is not prohibited.
Additionally, a recent study conducted by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), with the participation of the International Labour Organization (ILO), considered the agriculture and construction sectors in Lebanon as "the most hazardous industries for adult and child workers," with common risks including exposure to pesticides and toxic substances, dangerous machinery and tools, harsh weather conditions, long working hours, and poor living conditions[32].
For example, Decree No. 15874 related to the new Building Law No. 646 issued on 11 December 2004 requires the issuance of a building permit after verifying that the building or structure complies with public health and safety, but it does not specify the criteria that safeguard health or safety, nor does it include any standards for monitoring or holding accountable those who fail to comply with public health and safety[33].
Therefore, the construction sector ranks at the top regarding workplace accident and fatality rates, due to the absence of health and safety systems, in addition to internal policies of small and medium Lebanese companies that negotiate workers’ safety and use it as a means to reduce production costs. Being a labor-intensive sector where temporary and irregular work is widespread, along with jobs requiring low skills and low wages, the construction sector is highly vulnerable to forced labor, similarly to agriculture. This is alongside the specific risks and complexities of the construction sector, such as intense competition, strict deadlines, high levels of informal work, and heavy reliance on subcontracting and outsourcing to third parties, making it a highly risky sector in terms of human rights violations.
In addition to these gaps in the comprehensiveness of labor law, the current law suffers from several flaws resulting from the lack of consideration of the specificities of different social groups, even though they represent a significant part of the workforce in Lebanon, such as foreign workers, refugees, and people with disabilities. Meanwhile, discrimination and exclusion are widespread in labor markets and hiring practices in Lebanon, especially discriminatory practices based on gender, ethnicity, or sexual orientation[34].
Furthermore, legal protection, despite its development over time, has mostly taken the form of granting "privileges" dedicated to workers in certain types of work contracts, excluding others. Therefore, the social protection system in Lebanon has played a marginal role in reducing social inequalities and has historically been considered a tool for granting privileges and benefits to relatively well-off groups such as public employees and security and military personnel. This type of exclusion often harms women, foreigners, ethnic minorities, and young workers, exacerbating the persistent violations stemming from fragmentation and arbitrariness[35].
CHAPTER 3
Maternity risks and gender gaps in Lebanese labor markets.
Economics considers pregnancy and motherhood as social risks that require collective coverage, just like the risks of aging and disability, as they involve the absence of social security and stability. Maternity risks are events that lead to a loss of income for mothers, generate additional costs for the care of the mother and children, and impose a career interruption on pregnant women or mothers, which reduces opportunities for professional advancement.
Therefore, in recent years, social protection systems have evolved to provide better social coverage against these risks, including cash or in-kind assistance. Cash compensation is generally used to provide women with income during maternity leave, through maternity benefits covered by mandatory maternity insurance, which in some countries may be supplemented by an allowance paid by the employer to guarantee the same level of income.
In Lebanon, the social security law does not cover maternity leave, which ultimately remains the responsibility of the employer, often negotiated with the working mother or employee. This makes maternity benefits a subject of conflict between workers and employers and is considered part of the human resources policies in large companies seeking to avoid or reduce maternity leave to ensure work continuity.
Due to the absence of social insurance for maternity risks, women face discrimination in employment, where men are preferred over women, all other factors remaining equal[36].
The issue of maternity risks raises many fundamental problems related to gender equality that go beyond protecting the mother or child. It results in a bias in fairness between men and women throughout the professional career and affects balances outside the workplace, such as the distribution of domestic tasks within the family, as well as the reproduction of gender wage gaps and inequalities, as will be explained below.
First, despite the amendment of the labor law Article 28 in 2014, which increased maternity leave from 7 to 10 weeks, this duration is still below international standards, especially the recommendations of the International Labour Organization (ILO), which stipulate granting maternity leave for no less than 12 weeks as a minimum threshold.
Second, the Social Security Law and the Labor Law do not mention paternity leave, which introduces a severe discrimination between the sexes, given the lack of balance in family organization—such as childcare or domestic work—as well as in employment and income. This results in a disruption in the mother’s career trajectory that does not affect men.
Third, mandatory paternity leave could improve women’s return to work and reduce the negative effects caused by the imbalance in career progression between men and women.
From one perspective, if the maternity leave period is insufficient, this may expose women and children to serious health risks due to early return to work to maintain the job or income.
From another perspective, extending the maternity leave period in an obligatory manner without a corresponding paternity leave could increase gender gaps in income and wages because of the career interruptions women face, hindering their accumulation of experience, professional training, and lifelong learning more than men.
Indeed, these career interruptions translate in Lebanon into gender gaps in income and wealth, where this discrimination peaks among women of childbearing age—32% for women aged 30 to 49 years, compared to an average of 21%.
However, these gender gaps in wages and income decrease after the age of fifty but remain significant due to the career breaks experienced by mothers.
The wage disparity between men and women increases with years of professional experience. Women with less than five years of experience earn 10% less than men with the same experience level. This gap increases with experience: women earn 18.81% less than men between 5 and 10 years of experience, reaching a peak of 23.96% between men’s and women’s wages for those with more than ten years of experience.
Gender disparities also increase with job transitions, especially after retirement age due to the absence of a pension system for private-sector employees. Instead, they rely solely on end-of-service indemnities, calculated by multiplying the last monthly salary by the number of years worked in the institution, paying one month’s salary per year of service. These indemnities are lower for women due to fewer years worked because of pregnancy and maternity.
Gender gaps increase due to the absence of a gender perspective in labor legislation, leading to a lack of laws aiming to combat gender discrimination in employment, despite Law No. 207 issued on 26/5/2000 that prohibits discrimination based on sex between male and female workers in various areas such as job type, wage amount, employment, promotion, advancement, professional qualification, and dress code.
This is because this law does not specify monitoring mechanisms, does not recognize existing gender discrimination, nor clarify what employers must do to prevent such discrimination.
In the absence of these clarifications, laws prohibiting gender discrimination remain incapable of reducing gender gaps. This is evident today through global approaches, where data show that gender wage gaps persist despite legal amendments attempting to combat them worldwide. This indicates that mere legal recognition of the need to abolish gender discrimination is insufficient to achieve gender justice unless it is accompanied by positive measures that impose proactive obligations on employers to prove that their practices actively combat such discrimination. This is known today as proactive gender transparency practices.
These proactive measures mean that employers are legally responsible for justifying the gender wage gaps within their institutions, and for the lack of gender balance in employment between men and women in managerial positions and company boards. They are also obligated, through human resource management policies, to correct these disparities.
In the absence of such legislation that forces companies—at least the large ones—to achieve gender equality in wages, significant progress in reducing gender wage gaps is difficult to attain. The overwhelming majority of senior positions in companies are occupied by men, and women are excluded from boards of directors, which makes changing discriminatory practices more difficult.
Returning to the Lebanese model, in 2017 only 4.4% of companies included women in their senior management in Lebanon, compared to 7.1% in Egypt and 22.8% in Syria. From this standpoint, the Lebanese National Commission for Women considered that “women’s quotas in boards of directors may be an inevitable solution to bring women closer to decision-making in Lebanese institutions and companies, and to activate policies combating gender discrimination.” Accordingly, in June 2021, MP Inaya Ezzeddine submitted a draft law aimed at guaranteeing a 30% quota for women on boards of directors, considering that women’s presence in managerial positions is essential to changing company values, culture, and governance. However, the Lebanese Parliament refused to discuss the draft law.
Regarding wage transparency laws, these also play a role in enhancing accountability around gender discrimination, aiming to combat wage gaps.
These laws require employers to disclose the wage scales adopted internally within human resources policies across all job positions, provide employees with information about their rights to inquire and discuss wages, and inform them of judicial procedures to guarantee protection against retaliation if they raise wage issues.
Often, these proactive transparency laws include provisions allowing employees to file internal complaints and seek legal remedies if they face wage discrimination. They also include financial support for companies that conduct independent audits on pay equality, implement gender-neutral job evaluations, and actively work to close gender wage gaps, as seen in some European countries, particularly in Scandinavian countries.
For example, Iceland introduced a legislative law in 2018 requiring companies with 25 or more employees to obtain a pay equality certificate, meaning these companies must provide the state with evidence of the absence of gender discrimination within them[37].
It is also worth noting the German law aimed at enhancing wage transparency, known as the General Act on Equal Treatment, which dates back to August 18, 2006. This law integrates four key directives issued by the European Union to combat discrimination, which Germany has transposed through this law into the framework of its national labor regulations[38].
The law places responsibility on employers to ensure that no discrimination occurs. Additionally, they must take measures against employees who discriminate against their colleagues. Since 2016, Germany has gradually introduced laws and amendments to ensure gender balance in the management of large companies. Companies where women and men are represented unequally in management are required to fill any vacant positions with the underrepresented gender.
Moreover, the 2017 Pay Transparency Act requires companies with more than 200 employees to conduct internal audits on gender pay gaps and submit them to the state. Although the law does not impose direct penalties for non-compliance, employees can claim compensation for unjustified pay denials.
Additionally, German companies with over 500 employees regularly report on the gender distribution of wages and provide information on the gender pay gap within their institutions.
Since laws alone are insufficient to reduce gender gaps, strong labor unions and collective bargaining systems play an important role in promoting gender equality. Collective agreements and labor contracts often include provisions related to equal pay and ensure that gender is generally not a factor in wage-setting processes.
CHAPTER 4
Exclusion of LGBTQ+ individuals from labor markets and employment: Discrimination based on sexual orientation
The impact of the financial crisis in Lebanon on members of the LGBTQ+ community (lesbians, gays, bisexuals, transgender, non-binary, gender non-conforming, queer, asexual, and others with diverse sexual orientations) is connected to the broader social and legal contexts that require examining the Lebanese societal environment and the evolution of its values and social norms.
Nevertheless, the financial crisis has contributed to exacerbating the economic vulnerability experienced by some members of the LGBTQ+ community through job losses, unemployment, and economic instability. Members of the LGBTQ+ community suffer severe violations of their fundamental rights, which are closer to persecution than mere discrimination, both inside and outside the workplace. This makes them socially extremely vulnerable due to discriminatory or even persecutory practices in employment, housing, and exposes them to physical violence.
Lebanese law criminalizes these practices under Article 534 of the Lebanese Penal Code, which prohibits sexual relations that contradict the “order of nature” and punishes offenders with arrest and imprisonment for up to one year, in addition to the social stigma condemning sexual orientations that do not conform to the binary understanding of gender—that is, the normative, stereotypical, and traditional view of a relationship between two people of different sexes, namely a man and a woman.
The Lebanon Recovery, Reform, and Reconstruction Framework, adopted by the World Bank with the participation of the Lebanese government after the port explosion, revealed high vulnerabilities related to social inclusion that existed prior to the financial crises and the explosion, “especially among children, women, persons with disabilities, the elderly, refugees, migrants, and members of the LGBTQ+ community.[39]”
A recent study by the “Helem” association showed that 50% of the LGBTQ+ individuals surveyed believe their wages and salaries are lower than those of their colleagues with the same level of experience and competence[40].
Multiple studies have shown that rates of violations against members of the LGBTQ+ community have worsened amid successive crises, with increased levels of sexual harassment, physical assault, intensified social and legal discrimination based on sexual orientation, and heightened campaigns of defamation against their rights. Meanwhile, LGBTQ+ groups suffer from a reduction or cut in external funding, which constitutes a significant portion of their support resources, thereby limiting the ability of many civil society organizations to effectively advocate on their behalf[41].
Those studies also showed that LGBTQ+ individuals are exposed daily to blatant violations of their fundamental rights in workplaces, taking various forms, including physical assaults and sexual exploitation by colleagues or employers, as well as what can be considered daily microaggressions or subtle daily and normalized violations[42].
Indeed, the “Helem” Association, in cooperation with the Lebanese Observatory for Workers’ and Employees’ Rights, has initiated monitoring of violations specifically targeting LGBTQ+ individuals, indicating the widespread occurrence of major violations of fundamental rights such as dismissals, wage discrimination, and denial of promotions, in addition to the prevalence of various forms of daily and ongoing persecution, which should also be described as microaggressions.
Although these microaggressions are not criminal offenses by themselves, they fall within the scope of attacks on dignity and fundamental rights, with negative effects on the victims, including verbal abuse, mockery, sarcasm, the use of implicit meanings, and verbal hints aimed at destroying self-confidence.
It is important to note here that these aggressive practices do not only target direct victims among LGBTQ+ individuals, but also contribute to the violation of the rights of all workers in that workplace environment, as they spread coercion, harassment, and intimidation. This replaces merit-based work standards with conformity to an ethical—or rather unethical—norm that management may arbitrarily impose on its employees and agents.
First and foremost, it should be mentioned that all forms of discrimination based on sexual orientation in the workplace and employment constitute a blatant violation of Lebanese laws, especially constitutional rights, notably Article 7 of the Constitution, which stipulates equality for all before the law.
Secondly, all of these discriminatory practices, taken as a whole, can be considered violations of the labor laws and regulations currently in force in Lebanon, even though the Labor Law of 1946 and its subsequent amendments do not explicitly address the rights of LGBTQ+ individuals, nor were they intended to explicitly prohibit mechanisms of discrimination based on sexual orientation.
While the criminalization of discrimination based on sexual orientation may be considered one of the blind spots in the current legal framework, the laws that prohibit all forms of sex-based discrimination may themselves serve as a key starting point for affirming that discriminatory practices against LGBTQ+ individuals constitute a clear violation of labor law.
In particular, Law No. 207, issued on May 26, 2000, states the following: “It is prohibited for the employer to discriminate on the basis of sex between male and female workers in regard to the type of work, wages, employment, promotion, advancement, professional training, and clothing.”
Although this law amended Article 26 of the Labor Law, which falls under the category of "women’s work," it nevertheless represents an essential point of departure for combating all forms of discrimination against many—if not all—components of the LGBTQ+ community: first, because some of its members identify with a gender different from that assigned to them at birth; and second, and most importantly, because discrimination based on sexual orientation can be considered a form of sex-based discrimination prohibited under Law 207/2000.
This is supported by numerous legal opinions around the world, which recognize discrimination based on sexual orientation as a subset of sex-based discrimination, whereby the same legal principles apply to both.
In the United States, for example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Although sexual orientation was not originally included, in a landmark decision in June 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination also includes discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity—thus providing federal workplace protection for LGBTQ+ individuals.
Other examples of this interpretation—where sexual orientation discrimination is seen as a violation of sex discrimination laws—also emerge from guidelines issued by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)[43].
Since the Commission’s authority under Title VII includes ruling on employment discrimination claims filed by government employees, it has recognized that discrimination against an individual based on sexual orientation constitutes discrimination based on sex.
As a result, the Commission indicated in its guidelines that it is unacceptable for employers to discriminate against individuals on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity in matters related to hiring, promotion and demotion, training, job task assignments, disciplinary measures, termination, and the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
To clarify the convergence between discrimination based on sexual orientation and discrimination based on sex, anti-discrimination provisions also prohibit employers from excluding an employee from customer-facing roles due to their perceived mismatch with customer expectations in terms of appearance and dress. This is precisely what is stipulated in Lebanon’s Law 207/2000, which amended Article 26 of the Labor Law. This law prohibits employers from discriminating against employees and workers for not conforming to gender-based norms of appearance.
Does this mean the law explicitly prohibits discrimination against men perceived as behaving or appearing in stereotypically feminine ways, or against women perceived as behaving or appearing in stereotypically masculine ways? In addition, preventing a transgender person from dressing or appearing in accordance with the identity they express could also constitute sex-based discrimination under Article 26.
Indeed, in the United States, the Commission relied on this convergence—recognizing that discrimination based on sexual orientation is a form of sex-based discrimination—when it ruled that employers may not deny employees equal access to restrooms, changing rooms, or showers. In such cases, the Commission enforced regulations consistent with the employee’s gender identity. Therefore, if an employer provides separate changing rooms or restrooms for men and women, all men—including transgender men—must be allowed to use the men's facilities, and all women—including transgender women—must be allowed to use the women's facilities.
There may be many examples, but we would like to highlight that Article 26 today constitutes a starting point to reaffirm that discrimination based on sexual orientation is a violation of labor regulations—even in the presence of the aforementioned blind spots in Lebanese law. However, this alone is, of course, insufficient as a legal basis to ensure equality for all individuals in employment and the workplace.
Lebanese law must explicitly include provisions that condemn all forms of discrimination, including discrimination based on race, sexual orientation, and gender identity, while also emphasizing equal access to health insurance and prohibiting private insurance companies from practicing any form of discrimination or exclusion.
Finally, it is essential to focus on prohibiting all forms of workplace harassment, including harassment based on sexual orientation or gender identity[44].
At this stage, it is worth noting that LGBTQI+ individuals suffer more than others from the lack of health coverage. A study conducted by Helem showed that only 20% of those surveyed had private health insurance. Furthermore, most health services do not recognize many of the specific needs of LGBTQI+ individuals, including uncovered or excluded medications, and the non-recognition of certain medical tests or surgical procedures, such as gender-affirming surgeries or hormone therapy.
On the other hand, what has been said about fighting discrimination based on sex or sexual orientation also applies to the criminalization of harassment.
Moreover, legislative amendments alone are not sufficient to combat harassment. There is a need for changes in internal policies and complaint mechanisms within institutions. Employers should be encouraged—or even required—to adopt clear policies and procedures for combating harassment based on sex or sexual orientation. These policies must establish relevant guidelines for reporting harassment, along with detailed procedures for investigating and sanctioning perpetrators.
Such internal policies are essential to effectively implement Law No. 205/2020, which criminalizes harassment. Employees and workers must feel empowered to report harassment without fear of retaliation or punishment—particularly LGBTQI+ individuals, who are more vulnerable to repressive practices due to their fear of resorting to the judiciary, primarily because of the potential consequences of Article 534.
While many judges today prioritize the protection of the victim over the principle of criminalization—as shown in a study by Legal Agenda—this harm-reduction approach alone is not sufficient to guarantee safe access to justice[45].
In conclusion, mechanisms of discrimination and exclusion based on sex remain deeply linked to the absence of legal provisions that aim to protect LGBTQI+ individuals, and to the continued criminalization of their identities and practices. This implies that the current legal framework implicitly legitimizes the erosion or violation of their fundamental rights, both inside and outside the workplace.
Article 534 of the Penal Code sends a dangerous signal to employers: it suggests that Lebanon’s legal and institutional framework not only tolerates violations of the rights of LGBTQI+ workers but also implicitly condones or colludes with the perpetrators of discrimination and exclusion.
From this perspective, the defense of labor rights for LGBTQI+ individuals becomes a cornerstone of the broader struggle against all forms of workplace discrimination—including those based on sex, race, or health status. These forms of discrimination often intersect and collectively contribute to undermining merit-based employment structures.
Thus, neglecting the rights of LGBTQI+ workers weakens existing laws that aim to combat sexual and gender-based harassment and discrimination.
Finally, it is crucial to recognize that fostering an inclusive workplace culture—regardless of sexual orientation—can generate positive spillover effects for all employees. This includes promoting integrated work cultures, building more democratic institutional frameworks, enabling environments for dialogue, understanding, and idea exchange, and activating critical thinking. All of these are essential components of today’s work environments and will play an increasingly important role in the future of work.
Inclusive workplaces are, therefore, better equipped to keep pace with the changing nature of work—through greater emphasis on inclusion and diversity. As such, the fight against discrimination based on sexual orientation becomes a strategic entry point for transforming workplaces from environments rooted in violence, oppression, and intimidation into inclusive spaces for communication, collaboration, and shared experience.
CHAPTER 5-
Specific and Intersectional Challenges Faced by Foreigners and Refugees in the Workplace
Foreign and migrant workers, whether migrants or refugees, constitute a significant—albeit difficult to estimate—portion of the labor force in Lebanon. The Lebanese labor market has long depended on non-Lebanese workers, who have been subjected to the worst forms of exploitation. This exploitation intensified even further before the 2019 crisis with the introduction of the sponsorship (kafala) system for Syrian workers, leading to unprecedented levels of abuse.
The adoption of the kafala system for Syrian laborers brought about new and extreme forms of exploitation, particularly targeting a segment of the labor force that had consistently been one of the largest components of the workforce in Lebanon.
According to the Engineers' Syndicate, the construction sector employed only about 110,600 Lebanese workers over the decade preceding the 2019 collapse—approximately 7% of the Lebanese labor force—while the number of Syrian workers in construction consistently ranged between 300,000 and 600,000, depending on the period[46].
Several studies have shown that Syrian refugee workers with sponsors (kafeel) are more likely to earn wages below the minimum wage than Syrian refugees without sponsors, even though the latter work without valid residency permits and are thus considered "illegal" residents by the state.
In the decade preceding the 2019 economic collapse, the country received on average more than 400,000 non-Arab migrant workers—mainly from Asia and Africa—under the sponsorship system. In addition, there were around 200,000 foreigners residing irregularly in Lebanon, driven by demand for cheap and unprotected labor. Among them, the number of undocumented domestic workers exceeded 120,000[47].
Lebanon's financial crisis has had a profound impact on migrant workers, particularly due to the collapse of the national currency. This collapse narrowed the wage gap between foreigners who were supposed to be paid in U.S. dollars and local workers—including Lebanese, Syrians, and Palestinians—whose salaries were paid in Lebanese lira. As a result, the balance of power that had existed before the crisis shifted dramatically.
The economic contraction and financial crisis have led to widespread job losses and increased unemployment rates among both Lebanese and non-Lebanese. However, migrants—especially those working in sectors most affected by the crisis, such as construction, domestic work, and tourism—have suffered from job insecurity and non-payment of wages more than others. They are often subject to severe vulnerability due to limited legal protections and weak social support networks, healthcare, and essential legal services and protections. The financial crisis has exacerbated their fragility by limiting their ability to seek assistance, move freely, or access healthcare services.
The most significant impacts on the situation of foreign workers of non-Arab origin are, first, their dismissal from their jobs, which directly means losing their right to reside in Lebanese territory, since residency rights are linked to employment rights. Second, they are subjected to dismissal conditions that violate the administrative frameworks regulating their work, namely the kafala system, which is unjust to them. This includes failure to pay their wages or cover their travel expenses, in addition to intimidation and violence practiced by employers to force them to accept their wages in Lebanese pounds instead of dollars, making them bear the full losses caused by currency depreciation.
Furthermore, many Lebanese employers have shirked their responsibilities by abandoning foreign workers on the streets, especially domestic workers, who are often left outside embassy or consulate offices—sometimes without passports—with the aim of shifting the burden of deportation from the state to NGOs or charitable organizations[48].
hese difficulties were not limited to domestic workers. Since the onset of the financial crisis and then the COVID-19 pandemic, all migrants have faced challenges returning to their home countries due to travel restrictions, financial constraints, or employers’ inability to provide necessary documents or fulfill contractual obligations.
Given that the kafala system has received increased attention in recent years, it is sufficient to mention the comprehensive study presented by Al-Mufakkira Al-Qanuniyya (The Legal Agenda) in cooperation with the International Labour Organization. The study concluded that the kafala system fundamentally serves as a protection mechanism for employers at the expense of workers. It guarantees employers impunity from punishment; it is an administrative practice rather than a legal one. It allows Lebanese employers to engage in illegal practices without permitting workers under this system to seek any legal protection because of their absence from courts and the lack of employer accountability in judiciary processes—often through deporting the worker before justice can be served[49].
The study further found that the kafala system eliminates foreign workers' ability to claim justice and leads to widespread absentee trials, which mostly proceed after the worker’s deportation. Additionally, kafala practices ultimately prioritize the authority of general security over the judiciary, and they represent blatant violations of numerous fundamental rights.
Hence, there is a pressing need to abolish kafala practices, as proposed by the Ministry of Labor in 2020, replacing them with a unified employment contract. The Legal Agenda also recommended ensuring justice by guaranteeing that complaints from domestic workers reach trial without deportation, linking this goal to the state's responsibility to combat gender-based violence and discrimination. Furthermore, it suggested taking into account the nationality of domestic workers in courts and arbitration councils to reduce legal deadlines, thereby securing justice within reasonable timeframes.
In addition, foreign workers suffer from discrimination under Decree No. 17561 issued on 18/9/1964, which regulates the work of foreigners in Lebanon, and Law No. 129, which restricts the right to work for foreigners by obliging them to follow official procedures that are open-ended and without specified deadlines.
This also contradicts the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Lebanon acceded to under Decree No. 3855 issued on 1/9/1972—specifically Article 59 of the Labor Law that stipulates that foreign workers, upon dismissal, enjoy the same rights as Lebanese workers, conditional upon reciprocity and obtaining a work permit from the Ministry of Labor. However, this law lacks any mechanism obliging employers to comply with its provisions regarding dismissal and ensuring the same rights granted by law to Lebanese workers.
Regarding Palestinian workers, Law No. 129 issued on 24/8/2010, which amended Article 59, confirmed that the laws and decrees regulating the Palestinian presence in Lebanon have been and remain harsh, significantly undermining their human rights. This has contributed to exacerbating their suffering since the beginning of their displacement. Among the most important are the laws and decrees related to the right to work.
Law 129/2010 has not been implemented due to the absence of a legislative decree to enforce it, highlighting the prevailing pattern in labor policy toward Palestinian workers. Labor policy annually treats Palestinian labor as foreign labor competing with the Lebanese workforce, which calls for protective measures favoring Lebanese nationals. This includes excluding Palestinians from certain professions and sectors and complicating their access to labor markets, despite the fact that they were born and raised on Lebanese soil, have lived in Lebanon for several generations, and, like other Lebanese residents, contribute to attracting foreign remittances through family support from abroad or international aid.
Palestinian labor in Lebanon remains a highly politicized and controversial issue, closely tied to the broader challenges of managing the entire Palestinian presence. In the early years of their refuge, Palestinian refugees were allowed to work in various sectors. However, the situation gradually deteriorated. Concerns about competition between the Palestinian and Lebanese workforces led to the issuance of laws and procedures that contradict international refugee protection laws, such as prohibiting Palestinian laborers from working in many sectors and professions.
Today, Lebanon’s legal and institutional framework prevents many Palestinians from working in jobs suited to their education and qualifications, except in some extreme cases like nursing. The access of Palestinians to employment and social security in Lebanon remains highly politicized and extremely complicated. They are prohibited from working in the public sector and in professions protected by unions such as medicine, law, pharmacy, engineering, and journalism.
Lebanese labor law justifies this exclusion by restricting these professions to individuals holding Lebanese nationality or those who are treated reciprocally in their home countries. This means foreign workers in Lebanon cannot obtain work permits or social security benefits unless their country of origin grants the same rights to Lebanese workers.
According to a 2003 Amnesty International report, this practice constitutes blatant racial discrimination against Palestinians in Lebanon because the criterion of “reciprocity” is impossible to fulfill due to their statelessness. This policy also violates international treaties signed by Lebanon and confines job opportunities available to Palestinian refugees to low-income, unstable, and informal sectors[50].
Over the past decade, many local and international organizations have attempted to address the issue of Palestinian labor in Lebanon. In 2010, a significant development occurred with the amendment of Social Security Law No. 128, which allowed Palestinian refugees to benefit from the National Social Security Fund in terms of end-of-service indemnities and exempted them from the principle of “reciprocity.” However, the scope of these benefits was not expanded to include health, maternity, and medical care funds.
For example, Palestinian workers born in Lebanon remain subjected to arduous procedures to obtain work permits, although they are exempted only from the cost. Furthermore, they are still expected to make full contributions to the National Social Security Fund despite benefiting only from partial advantages related to end-of-service indemnities, while being deprived of access to health coverage and maternity benefits.
Regarding the gains Palestinians have made, which are limited to their registration in the National Social Security Fund, it is important to note that this has been undermined due to the obligation imposed on employers to contribute only to two branches of the Fund. The Palestinian worker benefits from only one branch, especially since they do not benefit from health insurance or family allowances.
However, to this day, the implementing decrees for Laws 128 and 129, issued in August 2010, have not been formulated. Palestinians remain victims of the endless debate concerning the demographic threat, and more specifically, of the politicized and highly questionable statistical estimates regarding the total number of Palestinians in Lebanon, and their labor force participation rates, not to mention the existential risks faced by many Palestinians in Lebanon, including the risks of permanent settlement or local integration.
Regarding figures and statistics on Palestinian labor, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) reported in its 2020 annual report that 479,537 Palestinian refugees reside in Lebanon in 12 camps and 42 registered gatherings, while the General Directorate of Political Affairs and Refugees at the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities estimates this number at 592,711 persons. According to the "Socioeconomic Survey of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon" conducted by the American University of Beirut in 2015, between 260,000 and 280,000 Palestinian refugees born in Lebanon currently live in the country. Meanwhile, the most recent figures from the "Population and Housing Census in Palestinian Camps and Gatherings in Lebanon" indicate that the number of Palestinian refugees living in camps and gatherings is 174,422 persons.
Regardless of any debate about the total Palestinian population, the contradiction between these different sources highlights the ongoing decline in the number of Palestinians living in Lebanon. There is no doubt that the number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon continues to decrease due to ongoing migration to Western countries, the worsening of their economic conditions in Lebanon, and restrictions imposed on their right to work and their economic and social rights.
CHAPTER
Risks of Aging and Issues of Protecting Elderly Individuals in Lebanon
The issue of elderly rights represents a fundamental concern in Lebanon due to the weakness of the national social protection system and the absence of effective, comprehensive protections. Available protections have historically been limited and fragmented, benefiting only a minority of working groups before the 2019 crisis, primarily through the public sector or certain union funds.
From this perspective, it is surprising how the matter of guaranteeing old age security has been marginalized in labor policies over recent decades, despite its centrality—especially when considering its importance within Lebanon’s demographic structure. Lebanon remains one of the worst national systems in the Arab world regarding protection against aging risks, despite still being among the most demographically advanced Arab societies in terms of age.
Structurally, demographic developments show that Lebanon is the most aged among Arab countries, meaning it has the highest proportion of elderly population compared to other Arab states[51]. For comparison:
- Saudi Arabia has an elderly population (above 64 years) of approximately 2.4%,
- Egypt 4.8%,
- Morocco 7.4%,
- Tunisia 8.8%[52].
In Lebanon, however, the proportion of residents aged over 64 exceeds 11%, with an expected average lifespan of 78 years for men and 82 for women[53].
On the other hand, demographic trends in Lebanon also reveal a significant decline in birth rates among Lebanese citizens. The proportion of the population under 15 years old is just over 24%, a figure comparable to some middle-income or relatively young Mediterranean countries such as Morocco or Saudi Arabia, yet much lower than most Arab countries. For instance, in Libya, this proportion reaches 29%, in Egypt 33%, and in Iraq or Jordan 37%.
However, these birth rates in Lebanon primarily reflect the non-Lebanese residents. According to the 2018-2019 population survey, the proportion of the population under 15 years old among non-Lebanese residents exceeds 35.8%[54].
A study by the International Labour Organization (ILO) confirms that two-thirds of Lebanon’s population growth is due to foreign residents, as birth rates among Lebanese citizens are extremely low[55]. As a result of these demographic trends, the phenomenon of population aging is expected to increase in the future. The number of people over 60 years old is projected to more than double between 2020 and 2050—from about 765,000 individuals (11.2% of the total population) to 1,700,000 (27.1% of the total population). Simultaneously, the number of people aged 15 to 24 is expected to decline by about one-third[56].
The financial crisis has jeopardized the economic well-being of the elderly, as their pensions and savings lost value or were affected by currency fluctuations, resulting in diminished purchasing power and financial stability. Many retirees, especially those in the private sector, have had their bank deposits frozen due to the absence of a reliable pension system.
According to recent statistics from the ILO and the Central Administration of Statistics, 28.4% of seniors aged 65 and above lived on less than 470,000 Lebanese pounds per month in 2018—the period preceding the financial crisis—which was roughly equivalent to just over $300 at the time (compared to $450 before the crisis)[57]. This percentage surged to 54.3% in 2020, marking a 91% increase and the highest among all age groups[58].
As previously noted regarding fragmentation and exclusion in social security mechanisms, pension payments are almost exclusively directed to public sector retirees and members of the security and armed forces, who collectively represent about 10% of the workforce[59].
However, it is difficult to consider public sector retirees today as better off than private sector employees, given the drastic decline in health coverage in Lebanese pounds, effectively leaving many without real health insurance. Meanwhile, pensions for some public sector employees have fallen to nearly $10 per month, despite these employees previously being considered privileged due to their secure pension benefits[60].
To recall, the weakness of old-age insurance had already reached a critical level even before the 2019 crisis. In 2018, nearly 56% of elderly people in Lebanon lived in households without any form of social protection, while 80% lived in households without any form of pension or old-age insurance[61]. This means that at a time when 70% of elderly people in Lebanon suffer from at least one chronic illness, nearly half of them remain without health coverage[62].
The financial crisis has placed additional pressure on the healthcare system. As the capacity to protect retirees against the risks of aging deteriorated, most elderly people today face serious difficulties meeting their basic needs and daily expenses. Even before the crisis, many elderly in Lebanon struggled to access healthcare, independent and adequate housing.
The financial crisis strained the healthcare system, and the decline in government funding has excluded many in need from the coverage provided by the Ministry of Health. This has further complicated access to essential medical services and medications for elderly individuals, especially those suffering from chronic conditions or specific healthcare needs—such as kidney patients—who were historically covered by the Ministry of Health but not by private insurance companies.
he retirement challenges caused by the financial crisis have forced many elderly individuals to alter their retirement plans and expand their participation in the labor force, making senior employment increasingly common in Lebanon. With diminishing savings and financial resources, many elderly people seek to continue working past retirement age to support themselves and their families. This creates additional physical challenges and often requires them to accept working conditions or wages that do not correspond to their health status or skill levels, exposing them to potential discrimination or humiliation.
Indeed, a specialized study on the conditions of the elderly in Lebanon shows that 41% of seniors aged 65 to 69—mostly men—and 29% of those aged 70 to 75—also predominantly men—are still working[63].
Economic difficulties faced by youth due to the financial crisis have reduced the capacity of elderly individuals to receive support from their families. Only about 2% of elderly people in Lebanon live permanently or long-term in specialized care institutions, such as nursing homes. This indicates that the majority of elderly care in Lebanon is provided at home and within the family[64].
Numerous studies in Lebanon reveal that elderly individuals rely heavily on their families for both material and emotional support, in addition to depending on care networks provided by civil society associations, religious institutions, and charitable organizations. Ultimately, however, this social solidarity remains rooted in a charitable approach that is selective or discretionary, rather than being based on a rights-based, mandatory social protection framework[65].
Given the financial challenges faced by younger generations and the exacerbation of youth emigration, social support networks are increasingly unable to provide sufficient financial assistance and care for elderly relatives and neighbors. This contributes to heightened feelings of isolation and loneliness among the elderly, especially as social centers, programs, and activities aimed at participation and social support suffer from funding interruptions.
From this perspective, it becomes essential to recognize the value of older individuals by adopting inclusive age-related labor policies that address age and health-related discrimination. This would ensure their ability to participate actively in the workforce and benefit from their skills and knowledge.
Policies should include reforms that enhance flexible work arrangements and extend working life for older adults. This includes raising the retirement age, implementing phased retirement programs, providing incentives for continued work, and allowing older workers to remain active in the labor market if they choose. Additionally, pension reforms are necessary to address eligibility criteria and contribution rates, in order to close pension gaps and reduce poverty rates among the elderly.
Countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have recognized the importance of ensuring that older adults have access to digital technologies. They have invested substantially in bridging the digital divide by providing affordable internet access, promoting digital skills training programs, and supporting access to digital devices and their use.
Given Lebanon’s demographic profile, which forecasts worsening population aging in the coming years, policies promoting active aging and social integration of the elderly into labor markets are vital to improving their quality of life. There is also an urgent need for more comprehensive social protection legislation to guarantee adequate social security benefits and pensions for the elderly, alongside labor laws that prevent age-based discrimination in hiring and workplace practices, thus protecting economically active seniors late in their careers.
Laws must explicitly prohibit age discrimination in the workplace and ensure equal employment opportunities for older adults. This includes establishing fair and sustainable pension systems, improving coverage for informal workers, and addressing gender gaps in pension entitlements.
Furthermore, legal frameworks should actively promote the social inclusion and participation of older individuals in community life. This could involve enhancing intergenerational programs and encouraging age-friendly initiatives that strengthen social ties and combat social isolation.
These laws must also clearly define cases of elder abuse, stipulate penalties, and establish procedures for reporting, investigating, and prosecuting offenders. Additionally, they must guarantee older adults’ right to access quality and affordable healthcare services[66].
Finally, there should be encouragement of meaningful opportunities for older adults to engage in purposeful activities, participate in community life, and access recreational and educational programs tailored to their specific needs[67].
CHAPTRE
Exclusion and Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities
This chapter addresses the importance of inclusive employment for persons with disabilities, highlights the challenges they face, and emphasizes the urgent need to combat discrimination to foster a more just and inclusive society.
According to the World Health Organization, approximately 1.3 billion people worldwide live with significant disabilities, representing 16% of the global population[68].
It is now widely recognized that, given a supportive environment, persons with disabilities can work in most jobs and participate successfully in business.
Workforce inclusivity and diversity — including the inclusion of persons with disabilities, women, and LGBTQ+ individuals — have well-documented benefits for organizational performance, improved decision-making, innovation stimulation, and employee retention.
Moreover, integrating persons with disabilities brings direct economic benefits. When they can access suitable employment, they achieve financial independence, enhance their self-esteem, contribute to the economy, and pay taxes. Inclusive workplaces benefit from diverse perspectives, innovative problem-solving, and improved employee morale, leading to increased productivity and profitability.
This also enables government spending on disability to be viewed as productive investment expenditure rather than merely social spending.
State social interventions and labor provisions in many countries focus on closing employment and income gaps affecting persons with disabilities, adapting active labor market policies, enhancing vocational training or reintegration, and supporting advocacy groups or public awareness campaigns aimed at changing negative attitudes and combating stigma against persons with disabilities in the workplace and elsewhere.
Despite all this, persons with disabilities globally remain highly vulnerable to numerous human rights violations. They are disproportionately represented among the unemployed across various productive sectors. They face higher unemployment rates than the general workforce throughout their lives, including during youth and older age groups.
Among those with disabilities who do work, they are more likely to be employed part-time compared to the overall workforce, more exposed to informal and precarious employment, and generally earn lower wages than non-disabled workers[69].
In Lebanon, persons with disabilities face significant barriers to accessing stable, socially protected employment due to discrimination and exclusion embedded in education and employment policies. The overwhelming majority remain excluded from labor markets for life, while only about 1% of school-age disabled children are integrated into formal education.
Lebanon lags behind many countries that have implemented a range of political initiatives to improve access to work, education, and skills development for persons with disabilities. In fact, Lebanon is one of only 16 countries worldwide that do not provide social disability pensions[70].
This entrenched exclusion reflects systemic discrimination, both in education and employment policies, reinforcing a cycle of marginalization where most persons with disabilities remain outside the labor market permanently, and nearly no children with disabilities are included in public schooling[71].
When persons with disabilities manage to find employment, they often face informal working conditions, lower wages, and a lack of essential protections. In Lebanon, the proportion of persons with disabilities working informally reaches 63.8%, significantly higher than the 43.4% rate among non-disabled workers. Furthermore, workers with severe disabilities in Lebanon earn on average 35% less than their non-disabled counterparts, with an even larger wage gap of 37% in the formal private sector[72].
Disability and inclusive employment are fundamental components of a just and equitable society. By combating discrimination against persons with disabilities and promoting inclusive hiring practices, societies can harness the vast potential and talents of individuals with disabilities. It is crucial to continue raising awareness, improving accessibility, and strengthening legal protections to build a society that values diversity, inclusion, and equal opportunities for all.
From this perspective, several countries, including some Arab states, have introduced mandatory employment quotas as minimum thresholds for employers in both the public and private sectors, often applying to organizations exceeding a certain number of employees.
These laws frequently include provisions allowing employers to meet quotas through alternative means, such as subcontracting, outsourcing, or purchasing products and services from persons with disabilities—especially in public procurement contracts, as seen in Tunisia. They also include public subsidies and government assistance programs to support the employment, training, and integration of persons with disabilities, with particular emphasis on women[73].
In Lebanon, the issue of disability and inclusive labor has gained significant attention in recent years. While important progress has been made in achieving legal recognition of the importance of integrating persons with disabilities and prohibiting discrimination against them, there remains an urgent need for practical measures to combat discrimination against persons with disabilities both inside and outside the workplace.
It is also important to note that disability-based discrimination intersects with age- and gender-based discrimination. Indeed, disability rates increase with age: between 16% and 21% of persons aged 65 and above live with disabilities, compared to only 2.6% of those aged 15 to 64. The highest disability rates are found among older non-Lebanese women (aged 65 and over) at 21%, followed by older Lebanese women at 19.4%[74].
The International Labour Organization also highlights that disabilities increase significantly in Lebanon after the age of fifty, with women being more likely to live with a disability than men. Disability-based discrimination intersects with class disparities and wage gaps: among households with incomes below 650,000 Lebanese pounds, 27.2% have a member with a severe disability, compared to only 13.3% of households without any disability[75].
According to the same study, among the working-age population (ages 18 to 59), the labor force participation rate is 26% for those with severe disabilities and 38% for those with mild disabilities, compared to 59% for non-disabled individuals. There is a pronounced gender gap: only 12.7% of women with severe disabilities participate in the labor force, compared to 35.9% of men with severe disabilities.
Although Lebanese law condemns discrimination against persons with disabilities, it does not penalize violators, making enforcement extremely difficult.
Firstly, the official coverage of persons with disabilities in Lebanon is underestimated. Official figures report a prevalence rate below 3%, while the global average is 16%[76]. A recent International Labour Organization study estimates that in 2019, 4.4% of Lebanese and 2.4% of non-Lebanese residents were classified as having at least one severe disability, while 12.7% of Lebanese and 5.7% of non-Lebanese had at least one mild disability[77].
Other studies estimate the proportion of persons classified as disabled to exceed 10%, with 80% never having secured paid employment throughout their lives[78].
Second, persons with disabilities who have obtained disability cards from the Ministry of Social Affairs program are entitled to various aids, such as specialized equipment like wheelchairs, crutches, hearing aids, and some tax exemptions—for example, waivers on municipal fees, property tax, customs duties, and vehicle registration fees. However, the coverage rate of these cards is undoubtedly far below the needed level, both in terms of ensuring the social inclusion and economic participation of persons with disabilities and in excluding a very high proportion of them from these benefits, although exact estimates are currently difficult to obtain.
Third and most importantly, there is an urgent need to reconsider government expenditure on persons with disabilities to fully implement Law 220, dated May 29, 2000, as well as to advance the project to establish a platform for organizations representing persons with disabilities as part of the national social protection strategy. This strategy aims to establish government assistance programs for persons with disabilities.
It is important to emphasize that government spending on persons with disabilities transcends mere social welfare as a tool for social justice; such spending can take on the character of productive investment if embedded within integrated social programs designed to include persons with disabilities and combat their labor market underutilization.
This productive or investment dimension of social expenditure on disability is recognized by Law 220, ratified by the Lebanese Parliament on May 29, 2000, which approved the draft law contained in Decree 1834 concerning the rights of persons with disabilities.
A positive feature of this law is its recognition that “disability results directly or indirectly from society itself,” meaning it constitutes a social risk that requires collective coverage through a social protection system based on tax solidarity.
The law asserts that any lack of equal opportunity for persons with disabilities constitutes a violation of the principle of equality before the law, necessitating a transformation in relationships between the public and private sectors, institutions, or individuals—from relations based on familial, sectarian, or political affiliations to relations grounded in rights.
It remains that this law, which establishes groups of national committees and specialized bodies in labor, health, training, and sports, and enshrines a series of rights such as the right to housing, work, and non-discrimination, is insufficient to activate these “abstract” laws and make them effective, in the absence of practical procedures and strict penalties that guarantee the realization of these rights. According to Article 73, the law stipulates the allocation of positions in the public sector for persons with disabilities at a rate of no less than 3% of the total number for all categories and positions, without mentioning mechanisms to verify this goal or steps to correct gaps, nor is the law supplemented by active labor policies aimed at achieving it.
Moreover, Article 74 obliges employers in the private sector, where the number of employees is not less than twenty and does not exceed sixty, to employ at least one person with a disability, and at a rate of 3% in institutions with more than sixty employees. However, violations only require employers to pay a trivial fine amounting to twice the minimum annual wage for each employee, which does not constitute any real deterrent but rather an actual obstacle to employing and integrating persons with disabilities, especially since the majority of institutions in Lebanon are micro, small, or medium-sized with fewer than twenty employees and therefore are not subject to Article 74 of the law.
The United States Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 allows for fines reaching $75,000 for the first violation and $150,000 for additional violations. States and local governments may impose additional fines since they often require companies to meet a higher level of accommodation than what the ADA demands.
The Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act in the U.S., enacted in 2014, focuses on improving employment outcomes for individuals with disabilities. This law strengthens cooperative efforts among government vocational rehabilitation agencies, disability service providers, and employers to enhance job training, education, and employment services for persons with disabilities. Generally, it emphasizes vocational rehabilitation outcomes and competitive integrated employment and places greater focus on transition services for youth with disabilities[79].
Therefore, the level of penalties resulting from violations, especially the incentives arising from employing persons with disabilities under Article 75 of the law, should be reconsidered—not tied to the minimum level but expanded to cover a wider range of beneficiaries so that they become an effective lever for employment and integration, not merely a symbolic recognition of abstract rights that cannot be enforced.
In addition, Article 76 was limited to considering that “no employee may be dismissed due to having a disability unless that disability prevents them from performing the job they are assigned or any other job within the administration,” without specifying any of those conditions. This also makes it a mere symbolic recognition that is not practically enforceable, especially with the absence of occupational health in the majority of companies and institutions in Lebanon. While it is important to define anti-dismissal mechanisms, it is equally necessary to determine procedures that prevent discrimination on health grounds in employment, wages, and promotion.
As noted, these reforms may not constitute additional burdens on public finances, even if some involve increased government social spending or expanding the scope and proportion of public incentives such as tax exemptions. This is because government spending aimed at achieving an inclusive labor market is an investment that allows the state to generate additional mandatory revenues if it is fully integrated within active labor policies and comprehensive action plans based on programs. This also calls for transitioning from line-item budgets, i.e., allocating fragmented and annual expenditures and appropriations to the Ministry of Social Affairs and other bodies, to program budgets that set multi-year government plans based on objectives. This is what we elaborate on in the following recommendations.
CONCLUSION
Conclusion and Recommendations Related to the Development and Modernization of the Fragmented Institutional and Legal Framework and Combating All Forms of Discrimination in Employment
Through a comparative reading of labor law updates worldwide, this report demonstrates that national legislations in many countries no longer merely adopt a passive stance against discriminatory practices. Instead, they have evolved towards establishing proactive and positive measures requiring companies and employers to actively and voluntarily demonstrate the concrete practices they implement in their workplaces to ensure equality and eliminate gender, racial, sexual orientation, or health-based disparities.
This necessitates taking into account the specific conditions of various marginalized groups, as the issues of exclusion, discrimination, and their remedies vary vertically across social strata—for example, the exclusion of groups most vulnerable in terms of income or rights—and horizontally across different labor sectors, with discrimination between workers in sectors exempt from labor laws, or in terms of union rights, or even social protection coverage between public and private sector employees.
From this standpoint, amending labor laws demands a serious social dialogue among the diverse stakeholders and components of Lebanon’s labor and employment markets. It is crucial to integrate the most vulnerable or impacted groups into public decision-making processes to avoid overlooking the particular challenges faced by certain social or sectoral groups. This is especially important given the current laws’ lack of comprehensiveness, and the historical policies of fragmentation and specificity that have characterized social security provisions and labor laws, which have been further entrenched by successive labor policy amendments.
To summarize the main intersecting challenges faced by marginalized groups as outlined in this report:
- Future of Work Challenges: Given the rapid evolution of work forms, contracts, and relationships, coupled with the impact of technological and environmental changes on the future workforce, it becomes imperative to prioritize sustainable and inclusive labor policies. This ensures that no social group is left behind and that vulnerable groups have the capacity to keep pace with the jobs of tomorrow.
- Barriers to Access, Mobility, and Improper Use of Productive Infrastructure: Many workplaces lack inclusive mobility features—such as ramps, escalators, and elevators—that facilitate movement and access, especially for elderly workers and persons with disabilities. Moreover, digital access barriers arising from inadequate investment in inclusive technology for those with visual or hearing impairments prevent their full participation in job applications, training materials, or even accessing online resources.
- Wage Disparities: Women frequently face gender pay gaps and underrepresentation in the workforce. Similar disparities affect LGBTQ+ individuals and persons with disabilities, though these are harder to quantify due to their underrepresentation in official statistics.
- Stereotypes and Erroneous Productivity Assumptions: Legal protections alone are insufficient for workplace justice, as negative stereotypes and biases often infiltrate hiring processes, particularly against women, LGBTQ+ individuals, and persons with disabilities. Preconceived notions about limitations and productivity hinder the achievement of non-discrimination objectives and result in unequal employment opportunities for all citizens.
Moreover, the future of work is closely linked to the rise of platform work, non-permanent contracts, and self-employment, driven by technological advancements that fundamentally enable these new employment forms—such as facilitating remote work, crowd-based labor, and subcontracting arrangements. While these emerging forms of work open new opportunities and horizons for many individuals—especially young people or independent contractors who do not seek fixed, traditional jobs—they often create ambiguous “gray zones” between genuine self-employment and disguised employment. Furthermore, they frequently coincide with the absence of legal protections for workers under such contracts[80].
The future of work may exacerbate existing disparities in Lebanon’s labor markets, particularly affecting groups vulnerable to the digital divide, such as women and the elderly[81]. Certain groups could face even greater challenges in accessing new job opportunities created by technological progress, leading to increased income inequality.
Against this backdrop, social disparities within today’s educational system represent a fundamental challenge for sustainable and active labor policies, as these disparities directly influence the quality and quantity of labor supply. Therefore, efforts in active labor policies must prioritize establishing equality in skill development across the entire workforce, encompassing school-level, technical-vocational, and university education, as well as lifelong learning and on-the-job vocational training. This is essential to ensure that technological advancement delivers inclusive and equitable benefits, rather than generating additional exclusion and marginalization through the structural changes in the future of work.
At the same time, automation and mechanization increasingly marginalize routine tasks, while social and emotional skills—often the exclusive domain of privileged and affluent classes—grow in value within labor markets. As Pierre Bourdieu’s studies highlight, these skills tend to be monopolized by upper classes and fundamentally deepen class divides or even reproduce social inequalities across generations. This is because they constitute what Bourdieu termed “symbolic capital,” including abilities such as communication, leadership, assertiveness, collaboration, empathy, cultural intelligence, creativity, critical thinking, and problem-solving[82].
Consequently, productive institutions must implement internal policies to accommodate future labor market changes, such as providing training courses for older employees, ensuring gender equality in vocational training and lifelong learning, and establishing inclusive technological infrastructures that facilitate the integration of people with special needs into workplaces. Undoubtedly, inclusive work environments secure better long-term profitability for productive enterprises. However, these ambitions and goals often remain mere good intentions, as most institutions hesitate to invest in them, especially when short-term profit maximization dominates.
This reality calls for evolving labor laws and regulations to compel employers to guarantee such inclusive and sustainable environments, given their positive effects on the future of work and collective well-being, in addition to their role as anti-discrimination practices in workplaces.
From this perspective, the Lebanese economy urgently requires the design and implementation of active labor policies targeting vulnerable groups—including women, youth, LGBTQ+ individuals, the elderly, and persons with disabilities.
Regrettably, active labor policies have been almost entirely absent from the Ministry of Labor’s practices, despite earlier intentions expressed by the establishment of the National Employment Institution before the war, and despite initiatives launched in recent years to activate its role. Active labor market policies typically involve public interventions clearly targeting groups facing difficulties in accessing employment. These policies include public employment services and other state-funded programs for job seekers.
Such active policies demand practical, enforceable objectives supported by government funding mechanisms within the state budget, typically through multi-year programs characterized as medium-term expenditures. These expenditures are justified by anticipated increases in growth rates, employment levels, tax revenue, and mandatory public revenues over the medium term.
Development challenges in Lebanon necessitate the activation of targeted, active labor policies aimed at combating the underutilization of the workforce, especially among women, youth, and persons with disabilities—groups experiencing high degrees of exclusion from the labor market. These policies must also include specific, complementary measures addressing foreign labor, in order to redress imbalances in employment markets.
While such active programs take various forms—such as employment services, career guidance, training programs, and capacity and skills building—financial support through tax exemptions and employment incentives remains a fundamental lever. This support enables increases in productivity and growth, promising higher tax revenues over the medium term.
For example, the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 2017 highlighted that closing the gender gap in Lebanon would lead to unprecedented economic growth and strengthen overall economic development. Specifically, if the labor force participation gap were reduced by just 25%, economic growth would rise by more than 9%[83].
To complete this fragmented picture of the current institutional and legal framework, it is important to note that Lebanon’s labor market not only excludes many social groups and privileges others in violation of the principle of equality before the law but also applies arbitrary criteria in distinguishing between formal and informal workers—not only among the most vulnerable groups.
Indeed, this arbitrariness extends to some individuals within socially or sectorally privileged groups. For instance, private university professors are often excluded from social security enrollment, and many engineers are hired on near-permanent contracts with annual renewals specifically to avoid registering them with social security—practices tantamount to disguised employment.
It is also important to recall that the current institutional framework excludes numerous collective risks that are not recognized as unemployment, old age, or maternity risks.
Finally, beyond legal exclusion, certain administrative practices may introduce additional mechanisms of discrimination or exclusion worth scrutinizing—such as excluding certain workers from legally mandated social protection due to organizational issues or failure to meet conditions; the state’s limited capacity to finance such protection through public spending; or the distortion of labor laws via disguised employment. This has resulted in workers being funneled into precarious, informal, or nonstandard employment forms—particularly among self-employed categories such as casual workers, subcontracted platform workers (e.g., delivery drivers, ride-hailing services), and workers in marginalized or legally exempted sectors, notably agriculture, construction, and non-Lebanese laborers.
s we indicated above, Lebanon’s institutional framework needs to expand the scope of social protection plans and social coverage mechanisms to ensure a minimum adequate level of social rights for currently excluded categories of workers, in addition to addressing the emergence of new social groups and categories within the Lebanese labor force that are seeking to assert their rights.
The first challenge at the level of social protection is the need to guarantee a minimum level of social rights for workers in all forms of employment. This requires expanding the scope of legal and social protection to include self-employed workers. This includes ensuring that everyone has legal protections covered by fundamental labor laws and regulations.
The second challenge is adopting a human-centered approach to labor policies — that is, establishing a rights-based perspective on work that places the human being at the forefront, particularly the most vulnerable individuals, in order to include them in economic and social policies and improve their working conditions through active labor policies based on combating discrimination and exclusion. This includes the need to prevent the exclusion of several groups from the labor market, such as migrants, refugees, women, and persons with disabilities, in addition to fighting discrimination based on race, religion, or sexual orientation.
Achieving this goal requires providing comprehensive protection mechanisms for various individuals, through ensuring broad collective coverage against labor market risks in a world where flexible and precarious forms of work are expected to increase.
In line with evolving legal and human rights standards worldwide, there is a current necessity to expand social protection to include at least the minimum floors of social insurance, as recommended by the International Labour Organization (ILO), in order to broaden the scope of social insurance benefits to address all risks encountered during working life, including entitlements related to illness, maternity, old age, work injuries, and unemployment[84].
There is no doubt that the Lebanese state has launched modest initiatives in past decades to expand and diversify the basis of social protection expenditure and to introduce a social protection floor not based on contributions—i.e., financed through social welfare systems relying on public spending and tax solidarity, such as the subsidized ration card or the national program targeting the poorest households—in order to provide basic support to the most vulnerable groups, especially since the start of the Syrian war, under pressure and support from the international community[85].
However, these initiatives have mostly remained ineffective and have proven unable to reduce fragmentation within the social protection system.
For this reason, it is essential to replace the palliative and temporary measures, generally driven by donor and political agendas, with a general, complete, and comprehensive review of the institutional framework governing the principles of social protection, which establishes a framework for the labor market and the renewal of the labor force in Lebanon[86].
In the absence of these comprehensive legal and institutional reforms, the currently prevailing fragmentation and particularism remain the main drivers of mechanisms of social vulnerability and systematic exclusion policies affecting many social and sectoral groups, contributing generation after generation to reproducing social disparities and recycling patterns of social insecurity.
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[1] LFSL, 2019
[2] Institut des Finances Basil Fuleihan. 2021
[3] Habib, 2019
[4] FAO & ILO, 2017
[5] Oxfam 2021
[6] Kanounj & Hariri 2019
[7] Insurance companies often seek to justify charging higher rates to individuals from LGBTQ+ communities by citing their sexual orientation or identity, claiming that they are more susceptible to sexually transmitted diseases. This also constitutes severe discrimination against individuals who are already medically more vulnerable than the general population.
[8] نزار صاغية، نيابة عامّة بيروت تغلّب حماية المثليين على ملاحقتهم: تخفيف المخاطر أوّ اً وحماية القانون للجميع، المفكّرة القانونيّة، 20 كانون الأول .2018
[9] ILO 2015
[10] Legal Agenda & ILO 2021
[11] UNFPA. 2022
[12] CAS & ILO, 2018-2019
[13] Handicap International. 2022
[14] Handicap International. 2022
[15] ILO 2023
[16] Scala, 2023 ; Vargas-Vargas & al. 2021 ; Mont & al. 2020
[17] UNFPA 2022
[18] Hariri 2023
[19] Stiglitz, 2013; Stiglitz, Sen & Fitoussi, 2009. As shown by Nouriel Roubini’s applied studies, European countries with effective legal protection systems were the fastest to overcome the impacts of the sovereign debt crises that followed the global financial crisis. In contrast, European countries that paid a heavy social price—such as Greece, Cyprus, Portugal, and Spain—were precisely those lacking protective mechanisms for workers. These countries failed to utilize self-stabilization mechanisms allowed by labor market supervisory systems to ensure a fairer income distribution or to provide basic compensation during work stoppages. All these points were considered in European policies and recommendations in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Roubini 2009.
[20] Dirani, 2021
[21] Similar to what happens in banking markets, where small customers bear the burden of financial crises, labor and employment markets in Lebanon show negative impacts from production crises on the most vulnerable social groups in terms of income and legal protection—especially since these groups were already suffering from blatant violations of their fundamental rights before the crisis.
[22] Hariri,2023
[23] Dirani 2019
[24] ILO, 2018-2019 ; CAS, ILO 2022 ,CAS
[25] CAS & ILO, 2022
[26] Behrendt & al. 2019
[27] ILO, 2019 ; ILO, 2021b
[28] ILO& CAS 2019
[29] LFSL, 2019
[30] Institut des Finances Basil Fuleihan. 2021
[31] Habib, 2019
[32] FAO & ILO, 2017
[33] The implementing decree 15874 lacks any specific provisions regarding the safety of workers, standards related to construction materials, or health and safety procedures. It merely links the issuance of building permits to the respect of public safety and health without defining these terms. It stipulates that the engineers responsible for signing the permit application are accountable for the measures taken to ensure public safety requirements. Article 4 states that building permits shall be granted according to the laws and regulations applicable to the area at the time the permit is issued, particularly those related to urban planning, health, and public safety. Article 10 exempts the state from its responsibilities, specifying that the accuracy of the studies prepared remains the responsibility of the engineers who prepared them (each according to their specialization), and that registering these studies with the Engineers Syndicate or the relevant technical departments does not entail any liability regarding the structural integrity of the building or its compliance with public safety regulations.
[34] Oxfam 2021
[35] Institut des Finances Basil Fuleihane, 2021
[36] Preferring to hire a man over a woman regardless of other variables—even when those variables are held constant—that is, the absolute preference for hiring a man over a woman with the same level of education, professional experience, competence, and salary.
[37] Act on Equal Treatment on the Labour Market, No. 86/2018
[38] Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz
[39] World Bank, 2020, The Lebanon Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework (3RF)
[40] Hachem & Zeidan. 2023
[41] Helem. 2021
[42] Even with policies against gender-based and gender identity discrimination in workplaces, LGBTQ+ individuals remain exposed daily and constantly to the risk of discrimination—particularly in the form of overt assaults, sometimes criminal, or more subtle forms that can be called microaggressions or partial persecution. Microaggressions can be defined as verbal or nonverbal attacks intended to harm the targeted victim through insults or avoidance behaviors—such as deliberately avoiding direct contact with the victim and socially isolating them within the workplace—or through intentional discriminatory measures, like ignoring ideas, proposals, or projects presented by LGBTQ+ colleagues, or excluding them from certain administrative tasks or social activities that accompany work relationships.
[43] Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Guidance
[44] Insurance companies often try to justify charging higher rates to individuals from LGBTQ+ communities by citing their sexual orientation or gender identity, arguing that they are more susceptible to sexually transmitted diseases. This practice also constitutes severe discrimination against individuals who are already more vulnerable health-wise than the general population.
[45] نزار صاغية، نيابة عامّة بيروت تغلّب حماية المثليّين على ملاحقتهم: تخفيف المخاطر أوّ اً وحماية القانون للجميع، المفكّرة القانونيّة، 2018.12.20 .
[46] Ajluni & kawar 2015
[47] ILO 2015
[48] Legal Agenda & ILO, 2021
[49] Legal Agenda & ILO, 2021
[50] Amnesty International 2003
[51] ILO 2022
[52] Global Economy Ranking. https://www.theglobaleconomy.com
[53] MOSA, 202
[54] The percentage of residents over the age of 64 among non-Lebanese residents reaches 2.3%. ILO & CAS 2022
[55] Ajluni & kawar 2015
[56] UNFPA. 2022
[57] CAS & ILO, 2018-2019
[58] ILO 2022
[59] CAS & ILO, 2018-2019
[60] Hariri 2023
[61] ILO, 2021c
[62] CSA, 2020
[63] CSA, 2020
[64] https://www.enicbcmed.eu/current-situation-dependent-elderly-lebanon
[65] Dayekh, 2022
[66] Despite the presence of 36 specialized elderly care centers providing long-term care, with a total of 6,000 beds according to the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health, most of these centers lack specialized staff and offer limited services. https://www.equaltimes.org/growing-old-without-social?lang=en elderly-centers/16827/3/https://www.moph.gov.lb/en/Pages
[67] Chemali & al. 2008
[68] WHO, 2023
[69] WHO and World Bank, 2011
[70] Handicap International. 2022
[71] Handicap International 2022
[72] ILO 2023
[73] Scala, 2023 ; Vargas-Vargas & al. 2021 ; Mont & al. 2020
[74] UNFPA 2022
[75] ILO 2023
[76] Hariri 2023
[77] ILO 2023
[78] Combaz 2018
[79] WIOA: The Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act 2014
[80] OECD,2017; ILO, 2021a
[81] Indeed, studies show that illiteracy rates today stand at 4.5% for Lebanese men aged 60 to 64, and 9.5% for non-Lebanese men in the same age group. However, the rates are significantly higher among women: 14.1% for Lebanese women and a staggering 83% for non-Lebanese women of the same age. UNFPA 2021.
[82] Bourdieu, 1979
[83] UN women 2020
[84] ILO, 2019 ; ILO & Unicef. 2020
[85] Boustani & al., 2021
[86] Hariri, 2023